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The Laws of Armed Conflict and Environmental Protection: Striking A Balance
I. Introduction
1. International Law and Wartime Environmental Protection
The post-Cold War era presents many challenges for the development of public
international law. States, which are its predominant subjects and are a major force for its
future development, will, as in the past, look to the "law of nations" to accommodate
conflicting interests within a legal framework which historically reflects states' vital
interests. Conflicts of interests, the extreme manifestations of which result in armed
conflicts, undoubtedly will continue to color the relationship between states. Thus,
international law is a fundamental institution which provides a fluid structure for the
myriad inter-state relations. One of its essential attributes is a dynamic process of norm-
building based on shared values and accommodation of countervailing values. This
process may be observed in two vitally important branches of international law: the laws
of armed conflict and environmental law.
In the last several decades, increasing awareness of and knowledge about the "natural
environment" has heighten international concern for "environmental protection".
Environmental law as a distinct branch of international law is still relatively undeveloped
and norms are evolving as states gain new knowledge of the environment. The emerging
environmental norms may be reflective of existing cultural norms, or as suggested by
Professor Stone, may influence the development of positive cultural norms towards the
environment In any event, the growing pains of this branch of international law may
highlight some of the most consequential value accommodations that may impact the
future of human beings on this planet

As Gundling notes, environmental protection may be one of the most difficult areas for
law because it necessarily involves value judgments. Among states these value
judgments are magnified due to the complexity of the environment and the wide-range of
human activities which present known and uncertain risks to the environment, both within
and beyond national jurisdiction While states have generally agreed on generic
obligations, in the context of armed conflict the status of norms relating to environmental
protection, and how to implement norms upon which there is consensus, is one of the
developmental challenges of international law
In contrast, the laws of armed conflict trace their lineage to antiquity and there is wide
consensus as to their content, though not surprisingly disagreements as to their application
in specific cases. Its historical development is documented extensively and is beyond the
scope of this paper However, for our purposes the traditional international law
distinction between thejus adbello and jus in hello requires mention. In short, the former
refers to the law establishing the legal basis to resort to force, and the latter to the legal
rules which establish the parameters for belligerents' means and methods for the conduct
of armed hostilities.
The contemporary jus ad bello is enshrined in the United Nations Charter
Specifically, the Charter makes resort to the use of force illegal by its mandate that
member states "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
o
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." However, while the
United Nations Charter is generally viewed as the centerpiece of the international legal
framework, elaborating the modern jus; ad bello, reaffirming the fundamental international
law principle of sovereign equality of States and establishing alternative mechanisms to the
use of force, it has failed to avert the outbreak of armed conflicts between states.
Consequently, the progressive development of theyws in bello as a means to regulate the

potential catastrophic consequences of modern warfare, particularly on the environment, is
as mentioned above, an important challenge to the future development of international
law.
The historical development of the jus in bello reflects a progressive evolution in
response to socio-political conditions. It is essentially the product of shared cultural
values and reflects essential state interests. Traditionally, this branch of the law of
armed conflict has been primarily concerned with promoting humanitarian considerations
during war However, as will be discussed herein, the laws of war also encompass
obligations for belligerents to consider the environmental impacts of wartime activities,
and are evolving to reflect with greater explicitness contemporary environmental values
emerging from the international law-making process.
2 Objectives and Conclusion
In this paper we shall consider the existing normative framework of the law of armed
conflict, thejus in bello, as it relates to protection of the environment We will review
customary law of armed conflict and highlight major conventional developments to assess
the necessity and feasibility for reform in light of the trend in international environmental
law to impose explicit environmental protection obligations on states. The Persian Gulf
War of 1991, illustrates the issues presented and the conflicting values inherent in these
two branches of international law. The post-war debate raised the questions whether the
"environment" is adequately protected by existing law from the environmentally
destructive potential of modern warfare, or is new conventional law on wartime
environmental protection needed. Serious consideration of these questions brings the
international law-making process to a crossroads as it attempts to accommodate evolving
environmental law norms, such as a yet to be defined "right of the environment", with
countervailing values encompassed in the laws of armed conflict, which emphasize military
necessity despite detriment to the environment.

Our study of the existing law of armed conflict framework, when considered as one
element of the modern international legal regime embodied by the United Nations Charter,
reveals a flexible legal regime which has incorporated emerging norms, including
environmental law norms, reflective of authoritative decisions. As suggested by
McDougal, authoritative norms are predicated on the existence of conducive socio-
political conditions. In view of the central role of sovereign states in the international
polity and their parochial concerns for "national security", which is reflected in part in the
long-standing balance of state interests embodied in the existing law of armed conflict, it
appears states are not yet willing to accept rigid conventional norms, or if accepted that
they will be adhered to, limiting the use of force solely to protect the "environment." Our
analysis of the development of the law of war demonstrates that its normative structure
has the necessary breadth to accommodate changing attitudes favoring greater
environmental protection as they mature into authoritative norms. Thus, we conclude that
of the available options, the present legal framework offers the best approach for the
development ofjus in bello "environmentally friendly" norms. Additionally, essential to
this endeavor is the necessity to strengthen the modern institutional structure of
international law. The international community needs to address the issue of compliance
with international law, by developing and strengthening the existing institutions, including
the available enforcement mechanisms, of the international "legal system".
II. Defining the Problem
1
.
Values: Regulating Armed Conflict Environmental Impacts
It is axiomatic that warfare is an inherently destructive activity and damage to the
environment, intentionally inflicted or collaterally caused, is one of its constant
consequences. The historical record, however, reflects that states are "motivated by
humanitarian, religious and - above all - practical considerations," to attempt to regulate

armed conflict activities in order to advance mutual values. Thus, common values
transcend cultural and political boundaries and are conducive to the emergence of
international legal norms aimed at limiting the kind and degree of damage during armed
conflicts. In essence, international cultural norms relating to constraints on warfare
damage evolved as war became a more devastating enterprise and these in time developed
into usage and customs embodied in the law of nations Commencing in the latter half of
the nineteenth century, international law underwent unprecedented institutional
development as states began to codify and extend customary law in conventions to address
specific issues in the conduct of warfare.
The early customary norms of the laws of war were primarily concerned with
protection of the "anthoropogenic environment" and people not directly involved in the
conflict. Thus, this branch of the laws of war is commonly referred to as "humanitarian
17
law." However, as discussed below, the principles of customary law, which are the
framework for the lawful conduct of armed hostilities vis-a-vis belligerents, also
encompass duties to minimize damage to the environment in connection with, and
independent of, the traditional protection conferred on non-belligerents Moreover, since
modern conventions have codified customary law, they impose the same obligations
relative to the environment. Further, conventional developments in recent decades have
included explicit environmental protection provisions These provisions are reflective of a
general trend in international law to protect the environment and manifest the evolutionary
1 o
assimilation of evolving norms, in this case environmental norms, into the jus in bello. 10
However, the conventions have been criticized as inadequate because the threshold of
damage to trigger their application is considered unreasonably high. Additionally,
conventional norms generally echo traditional law of war doctrines and seemingly protect
the environment as a means of protecting human beings and property. Overall, law of
war conventions do not conform with so-called "third stage" international environmental

law "instalments" which reflect a developmental trend "toward acknowledging nature's
rights in a biocentric perspective."
2. Legal Approaches to Wartime Environmental Protection
The experience of the Persian Gulf War of 1991 highlights the fundamental problem of
conflicting values underlying the future development of the two branches of international
law under discussion. The post-war debate manifested the divergent approaches to the
legal status of the environment and the manner of its protection during armed conflict.
On the one hand, the widespread outrage over Iraq's callous and seemingly unnecessary
"environmental tactics" may be viewed as an expression of an emerging, or perhaps
existing, "biocentric perspective" in international environmental law. This approach
suggests reforming the laws of war to impose explicit constrains on belligerents for
nature's sake, independent of human interests, to proscribe environmental damage such as
occurred in the Gulf War On the other hand, it is also tenable that under existing law of
armed conflict norms, Iraq's environmental tactics may likewise be condemned as
unjustified and unlawful. To consider these approaches to wartime environmental
protection and gain insight into the need and feasibility for normative reforms in the laws
of armed conflict, we next survey the content of the existing normative framework
relative to protection of the environment. We first discuss the customary law of armed
conflict, survey and consider pertinent conventional developments, and finally turn to
consideration of the status of environmental law norms and their applicability in the
context of armed conflict.
HI. Law of Armed Conflict: Customary and Conventional Norms
Section one discusses customary law of war and its applicability to environmental
protection. Section two surveys conventional developments and reviews provisions




As stated above, the customary laws of war establish the normative framework for the
lawful use of force vis-a-vis belligerents, and also establish duties towards the civilian
population and objects, (e.g. non-belligerents and the human environment), as well as the
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environment of neutral states. The four generally recognized customary law principles
also establish the foundation for the conventional norms discussed below and provide the
elemental basis for protection of the environment during armed conflict. Professor
Falk formulates the principles as follows, noting their "great importance in construing the
contours of existing international law" as it pertains specifically to warfare environmental
damage
a) Principles ofDiscrimination. To be lawful, weapons and tactics must clearly
discriminate between military and non-military targets, and be confined in
their application to military targets Indiscriminate warfare is illegal per se,
although indirect damage to civilians and civilian targets is not necessarily
illegal
b) Principle ofProportionality, To be lawful, weapons and tactics must be
proportional to their military objective. Disproportionate weaponry and
tactics are excessive, and as such, illegal
c) Principles ofNecessity . To be lawful, weapons and tactics involving the use
of force must be reasonably necessary to the attainment of their military objec-
tive No superfluous or excessive application of force is lawful, even if the
damage done is confined to the environment, thereby sparing people and
property (emphasis added).
d) Principles ofHumanity. To be lawful, no weapon or tactic can be validly
employed if it causes unnecessary suffering to its victims, whether this is
by way of prolonged or painful death or is in a form calculated to cause
severe fright or terror. Accordingly, weapons and tactics that spread poison
or disease or do genetic damage are generally illegal per se , as they
inflict unacceptable forms of pain, damage, death and fear, allforms of




The essence of these principles is captured by the overriding fundamental customary
law principle, also explicitly incorporated in modern conventions, which provides that "the
right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." These
principles are intertwined and within the stricture of the latter "principle of limitation",
97
their application during armed conflict involves essentially a balancing process. Their
amorphous structure obviously calls for subjective application within the context of the
military situation presented. Hence, not surprisingly there are often questions after most
wars about violations of the law This indefinite characteristic is one ground for
arguments that customary law is inadequate to protect the environment. However,
generality and ambivalence is generic to the international legal framework, customary as
well as conventional, and these norms by definition are widely accepted, they are just on
occasion bent at the convenience of belligerents. The post-Gulf War debate provided the
most recent forum for questioning the propriety of tactics within the framework of these
principles. Theoretically, to reach a tactical judgment which conforms with the dictates
of customary law principles of humanity and discrimination, the principle of military
necessity is critical as "the limiting factor on a belligerent state's ability to choose the
means and methods by which to harm its opponents... (and is) the measure of whether a
military action may be sanctioned as an unacceptable (disproportionate) act of war."
Undoubtedly, defining "military necessity" presents practical conceptual problems
leading to diverse opinions about "dubious" military targeting which adversely impacts the
environment. However, ambiguity and definitional problems are not unique to the laws of
war. Hence, we must accept the general nature of customary law, particularly the
T 1
concept of "necessity", as an "unavoidable requisite" of the dynamic process which
states have, by authoritative decisions, structured to address the myriad exigencies of
warfare. States have generally continued this amorphous customary law approach in
modern law of war conventions. As our classmate insightfully observed: "Vagueness in

language is an established rule of draftsmanship in the international arena." Hence, we
may deduce that states explicitly reject relinquishing broad discretion to apply proportional
force as deemed militarily necessary under the circumstances to subdue the enemy. The
balance of interests embodied in the customary law principles, which by definition is the
product of state consent and practice, is, as we shall see below, generally reflected in the
conventional law which pertains to environmental protection.
B. Applicability to the Environment
As highlighted by Professor Falk's formulation and the foregoing discussion, the
principles of customary law have "direct relevance for the protection of the environment",
and if observed in good faith provide far-reaching safeguards for the environment during
armed conflict Also, as one commentator reasonably suggests, the limitation principle
alone acts as a constraint on belligerent's environmental damage. Inasmuch as
belligerents do not have an unlimited right to inflict injury, it logically follows that not all
environmentally destructive acts of war are lawful To inflict environmental damage in
disregard of reasonably foreseeable consequences unrelated or disproportionate to the
military objective, would clearly violate this primary rule of the laws of armed conflict.
Professor Falk, who is skeptical of the extent to which customary law really protects the
environment, nonetheless concedes the importance of customary norms as possibly
providing "the only genuine basis for claiming violations of international law in relation to
the sort of belligerent practices associated with recent war ..." His views are premised
on the shortcomings of current conventional law which he perceives is "confined to the
outer margins" and does not address in comprehensive fashion the myriad environmental
concerns arising from modern warfare. *
Hence, unquestionably existing customary law of war provides a substantive normative
basis for protection of the environment from unnecessary damage, whether viewed from

an anthropocentric or biocentric perspective. In brief, under customary law, belligerents
may rightfully use proportional force required by the exigencies of legitimate military
necessity to achieve lawful objectives,(e.g. that which is reasonably connected with defeat
of the enemy), and are duty bound to avoid inflicting unnecessary suffering and excessive
damage. Thus, indiscriminate damage to the environment, either intentional or
collaterally caused, is prohibited since it violates the principle of limitation and inflicts
"suffering"
,
on the environment, as well as the human population which depends on the
environment for subsistence. In this respect, one commentator has suggested that the
prohibition against wanton destruction of the environment "is peremptory, as jus
..42
cogens.
Moreover, the indispensable role of customary law norms as a significant source of
legal constraints in wartime was explicitly recognized by the international community in
its earliest efforts at codification of the laws of war The preamble to the 1907 Hague
Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which improvised with
slight revision the 1899 Hague Convention II, declared
According to the views of the High Contracting Parties, these provisions,
the wording of which has been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils
ofwar asfar as military necessities permit, are intended to serve as a general
rule of conduct for the belligerents in their mutual relations and in their relations
with the inhabitants
It has not, however, been found possible at present to concert Regulations
covering all the circumstances which arise in practice.
On the other hand, the High Contracting Parties clearly do not intend that
unforeseen cases should, in the absence of written undertaking, be left to the
arbitrary judgment of military Commanders.
Until a more complete code of the laws ofwar has been issued, the High
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in
the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain
under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law ofnations, as
they resultfrom the usages established among civilizedpeoples, from the laws
ofhumanity, and the dictates of the public conscience (emphasis added)
10

The above final clause, the so-called Martens Clause, since restated in analogous
fashion in major law of war conventions, acknowledges the important gap-filling function
of customary law absent a specific provisions or treaty obligations. In regard to
protection of the environment during armed conflict the clause is potentially very
significant as there is no comprehensive treaty on this subject. Thus, it has been posited
that "(t)he customary law of war, in reflecting the modern increase in concern for the
environment as one of the dictates of public conscience in the sense understood in the
Clause, now includes a requirement to avoid unjustified damaged to the environment." °
In our survey of environmental law norms, we will consider the extent to which relevant
norms are reflective of authoritative decisions, and underscored by developing attitudes
in public opinion relative to protection of the environment during armed conflict.
At this juncture, it suffices to note that international environmental law has mostly
developed in the context of peacetime relations of states Consequently, the nature and
scope of binding obligations on belligerents under contemporary environmental norms is
not yet settled On the one hand, we can generally state that emerging environmental
norms do not appear to have attained the status of customary norms applicable in war,
which apparently is requisite for invocation of a Martens Clause rationale On the other
hand, there may be widespread recognition of some peacetime principles relative to
environmental protection, and corresponding obligations of states thereunder, to support
their invocation as binding customary norms applicable in wartime. One of the difficulties
encountered in assessing the wartime status of environmental norms is that they are found
in a plethora of instruments, and even those which are of binding character do not provide
for the contingencies of war However, and most significantly, some environmental
norms are reinforced by growing state practice, impelled in part by evolving concepts of
international state responsibility and progressive public consciousness toward the
environment generally Increasingly, environmental law instruments have recognize the
11

environment's intrinsic value and entail obligations for states to protection and
conservation diverse elements of the environment. Hence, commentators have
extrapolated from these developments that the current trend in international law is to
CO
recognize "nature's rights", the legal rights of the environment per se, A with the
implication that the customary laws of war, by virtue of the Martens Clause, should also
conform to this trend.
2. Conventional Law
A Overview
Law of war conventions supplement as well as codified customary law principles
Hence, in a general sense, convention law provides for protection of the environment
independent of and in conjunction with the promotion of humanitarian values In recent
decades, explicit environmental protection obligations have been included in conventional
provisions, a development seemingly in accord with "a change of the predominant
c->
paradigm in international environmental law" recognizing "nature's rights".
Conventional law of war, however, has not gone as far as "third stage" contemporary
environmental law instruments. Thus, the "biocentric" approach has not yet been
recognized by states in the context of armed conflict. Inasmuch as contemporary
conventional law of war reflects explicit accommodations of emerging values in favor of
environmental protection, it does not disturb the balance of values reflective of states'
policy strategies not to forgo the prerogatives implicit in customary law principles
Nonetheless, the significant development to be gleaned from these relatively limited
conventional norms in favor of the environment, is the adaptability of the existing
normative framework to emerging authoritative norms. As technological and scientific
developments in warfare and in the environmental field influence social conceptions of
what is militarily necessary and environmentally acceptable, the existing broadly framed
conventional, as well as customary, prescriptions are over time construed or reformed in
12

the light of "new thinking." In this respect, the laws of war are obviously like other
rules of international law, a system of laws which is far from static. The content of the
legal norms derives from a dynamic socio-political process and are defined by the
"recognized social forces of the time, to ensure that the purposive and instrumental use of
en
force...achieves its ultimate political objective in a controlled manner." Professor Falk
summarized the historical milieu leading to the explicit infusion of environmental values
into the law of war as follows:
The evolution of the law of war proceeded against a background of virtual
environmental unconsciousness until some awareness was generated by critics
of belligerent practices harmful to the environment during the latter stages of
the Vietnam War. In earlier wars, there were sporadic expressions of concern,
and even legal condemnations, associated with punitive tactics toward a civilian
population, such as the burning of croplands and forests and the poisoning of
wells Yet, until the early 1970's, when a broader environmental concern took
hold of the political imagination, no focused attention was directed toward
protecting the environment from the ravages of war... Beginning in 1972,
normative attention began to be directed toward environmental protection as
CO
a distinct public concern.
B. Modern Developments
The formative era of modern conventional jus in hello dates from the mid-nineteenth
century. This was a unique period of development for the international legal system
generally as positivism took hold as the "dominant juristic theory", within the political
system of nation-states who solidified the concept of their "sovereign rights" as the
cornerstone of the modern state system. States increasing power to organize mass
armies and the transformation in means of destroying the enemy resulting from advanced
technological developments in military science, were paramount factors in the dramatic
changes in the nature of warfare. These developments in the wartime relations of states
contributed to social imperatives and political incentives for watershed conventions which
had a "major formative influence on the structure of the modernjus in bello.^
13

Hence, the conventional developments culminating with the 1907 Hague Convention
IV, were landmark developments in international law, as states engaged in the
codification of prevailing customary law, and progressively developed the jus in bello to
secure mutual values affected by the changing character of warfare. In perhaps
unprecedented fashion, states endeavored to "humanize" war by explicitly prohibiting
specific weapons and by proscribing belligerent conduct during armed conflict.
Moreover, as noted by Professor Falk, in recent decades states in consonance with
prevailing social-political attitudes and economic needs, have also begun to instill
environmental conscientiousness into the laws of war
As mentioned above, since the mid-nineteenth century, warfare has become increasingly
complex and decentralized, as the ability to define the battlefield is essentially and
increasingly coextensive with the technological and military capabilities of the belligerents
This was most strikingly illustrated in the Gulf War by Coalition attacks on Iraqi targets,
some of which were carried out by cruise missiles launched hundreds of kilometers from
the target by warships on the high seas; and, by Iraqi engagements into neutral territory
with the infamous "Scud" attacks on Israel in an effort to broaden the hostilities
Accordingly, conventions have been tailored to respond to the complexities of warfare,
and may be generally categorized by the status of the geographic zone in which hostilities
take place, or by specific subject-matter relating to the means and methods of hostilities
Thus, to assess the legal ramifications of the environmental damage in question, it is
necessary to determine the status of the battle zone in which the belligerent is operating
(e.g. its own land or seas, enemy or occupied land or seas, neutral land or seas, or the high
seas).
Furthermore, as noted by Professor Falk, until recently there was no explicit
recognition of environmental interests in conventional law. But the interpretative process
by which the laws of war accommodate evolving norms is most evidently at work within
14

the authoritative decision-making process. In other words, conventional provisions
which do not explicitly address environmental damage are construed and applied under the
shining light of contemporary socio-political perspectives as relevant to protection of the
environment. These interpretations of non-environmental specific conventional provisions
are engendered in part by prevailing concerns for the environment per se, but by enlarge
sustained as normative in nature, and accepted by states, because the constraints in favor
of the environment are intricately linked with protection of human interests and the human
environment, the traditional subjects of humanitarian law Another significant factor in the
acceptance of these progressive interpretation is that they continue to recognize the
primacy of state's wartime interests by allowing for the imperatives of military necessity as
codified in the pertinent conventions This hypothesis is supported by the explicit
conventional provisions protecting the environment, which with some exceptions,
continue to subordinate environmental values to the "necessities of war". Hence, with
long-standing customary norms as its bedrock, and the maturity thus far achieved during
over one century of conventional development, the existing "law of armed conflict
contributes to the protection of the human environment, both directly and indirectly."
We now consider the extent of that contribution by tracing the landmark developments in
conventional law, focusing on the content of provisions relevant to environmental
protection during land-based armed conflict .
1
. The Hague Tradition
fin
a. St. Petersburg Declaration
The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 is a significant landmark in the evolution of
the modern laws of war. Among the first multilateral accords on the limitation of specific
weapons, its contemporary relevance with regard to environmental protection during war
lies in its affirmation of fundamental principles The Declaration affirmed the core
15

principles of customary law with "those attendant spirits of qualification and adaptation
which are part and parcel of the law of war's mixed history" as follows
...(H)aving by common agreement fixed the technical limits at which the
necessities of war should yield to the requirements of humanity, the Under-
signed are authorized by the order of their Governments to declare as follows:
Considering that the progress of civilization should have the effect of
alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war,
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy,
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of
men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly
aggravate the suffering of disabled men, or render their death inevitable,
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of
humanity,
The Contracting or Acceding Parties reserve to themselves to come hereafter
to an understanding whenever a precise proposition shall be drawn up in view
of future improvements which science may effect in the armament of troops, in
order to maintain the principles which they have established, and to conciliate the
•
• 70
necessities of war with the laws of humanity.
The Parties rejection of arms which inflict unnecessary suffering and which do not
promote "the only legitimate object" of "war among themselves", provides implicit
protection to the environment "to the extent that elements or regions of the natural
environment are not legitimate military targets". The Declaration, which is still in force,
and binding on non-parties to the extent it reflects customary law, was extremely
influential in foreshadowing weapons limitation agreements and cleared the common
72
ground for subsequent " Hague law" developments. '*
b. Hague Conventions
The Hague Conventions and Annexed Regulations are a tribute to the possibilities
of inter-state cooperation to regulate warfare activities. Therein states achieved
16

unprecedented milestones in the progressive development of international law generally
and thejus in bello specifically. Such a "precocious codification of the laws of war" was a
novel undertaking in international law, not to be replicated until decades later with regards
to other specialized subjects of law . The Regulations annexed to Hague Convention
IV, consisting of fifty-six articles, improvised and extended the patrimonial principles
implicitly embodied in the St. Petersburg Declaration to the field of warfare on land. The
Regulations are binding as customary law, thus its proscriptions are binding on non-
parties, such as Iraq, and also upon states that denounce the treaty obligations contained
therein.
Although the Regulations were the product of an era characterized by "virtual
environmental unconsciousness", they reveal "trends in the expectations of the global
77
community regarding destruction in general", expectations which were too often dashed
and thus the subject of further emphasis in subsequent conventional developments
78
regulating wartime conduct The three articles discussed below, in particular, reflect the
universal expectations of the international community and they have contemporary vitality
as norms pertinent to protection of the environment. However, they have been criticized
as inadequate vis-a-vis the environment since they express normative standards in
ambiguous terms, their principal orientation is the protection of narrowly defined
"property", or non-belligerents, and derogations based on the principle of military
necessity are permissible. These conventional norms nonetheless afford implicit
protection to the "environment", since they codify customary law principles and have
been subject to the gloss of contemporary perspectives recognizing the natural
environment as a legitimate and necessary object to be factored into the calculus of
80
wartime strategies.
The Regulations, inter alia, promulgate guidelines for the "Means of Injuring the
Enemy, Sieges, and Bombardments", and in article 22 codified the fundamental customary
17

law principle of limitation which circumscribes belligerent's rights to injure the enemy. *
In the spirit of this cornerstone principle of the laws of war, the following specific
prohibitions, discussed seriatim below, are set forth in article 23:
In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially
forbidden-. . . (a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons,. . (e) To employ arms,
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;. . . (g) To destroy
or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war,. ...
First, certainly banning the use of poison and poisoned weapons for humanitarian
motives has an obvious indirect protective affect on the environment, as such methods of
warfare have an adverse impact on elements of the environment generally, which
ultimately are prejudicial to the well-being of humans. This circular dependence
demonstrates the conceptual difficulties encountered in attempting to distinguish the
"environment", for separate legal protection, from the human species which is an integral
part of the global biosphere. The prohibition on poison and poisoned weapons was a
84
carry over from the earlier Hague Declaration 2 of 1899 and the expectations it
expressed were too soon thwarted by the horrors of World War I, during which over one
million casualties were cause by the use of toxic gases Consequently, states reaffirmed
and expanded their illegality in the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Chemical and Bacteriological
Warfare, which generally prohibited poisonous substances as well as use of
bacteriological weapons.
Second, our previous discussion of the duty imposed on belligerents by the customary
law principles of humanity and limitation, not to inflict "unnecessary suffering", and the
interplay among customary law principles, is equally applicable here as this provision is
87
essentially a codification of the former principle. At this juncture, we need only address
more explicitly the applicability of article 23(e) to protection of the environment. One
18

view is that this provision "can be interpreted as prohibiting any destruction of the
environment that will cause unnecessary suffering."88 Thus construed the "provision is
narrow in scope and offers limited protection under most circumstances" as the primary
focus is on the relative "unnecessary suffering" inflicted on humans 8 However, Leibler
posits a broader interpretation which would prohibit "superfluous environmental damage"
per se on the basis of the language of the authentic French text of article 23(e) . Leibler's
rationale is as follows:
Primafacie, the use of the word "suffering" suggests that the principle is
concerned with unnecessary harm to persons, excluding property damage or
damage to the natural environment. However, the authentic French text of
Article 23(e) uses the words "propres a causer des maux superflus" which are
more accurately translated as "a nature to cause superfluous injury." The signi-
ficance of this wording for present purposes is that the word "injury" is not
limited to personal harm It includes property damage, environmental damage,
or damage to any "thing" as indicated by the following definition of "injury" in
Webster's Third New International Dictionary "INJURY:. . . the act or
result of inflicting on a person or thing something that causes loss, pain, distress,
or impairment."
Hence, considering the apparent broader terms of the French text, as well as the
international reactions and pending actions in connection with the wartime environmental
99damage caused by Iraq in the course of the GulfWar , Leibler's analysis of article 23(e)
appears to be consistent with the present trend in international law to protect the
environment. Moreover, Leibler notes the subsequent joint usage of the terms
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"superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering" in article 35(2), of the 1977 Protocol I and
the preamble to the 1981 Inhumane Weapons Convention, to further validate the
propriety of the broader interpretation based on the equally binding French text.
Both views, of course, have merit in the context of the GulfWar and reveal that article
23(e) does afford the environment some measure of protection. However, the general
nature of the principle has raised doubts as to its practical effectiveness, doubts by enlarge
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reinforced by the Gulf War experience. One commentator thus assessed its weak
normative force, except in the most odious cases, as follows:
Taken on its face value, the provision is couched in such vague and uncertain
terms as to be barren of practical effects
. . . (T)he way States have attempted to
implement Article 23(e), either in military manuals or in the few cases where the
rule was invoked, shows that no common consent has ever evolved among States
as to the actual normative value of the principle
Article 23(e) as it stands now plays in practice a normative role. . . in
extreme cases (such as cases where the cruel character of a weapon is so
manifest that nobody would deny it, or where evidence can be produced
of gross, repeated and large-scale violations of the principle).
Implicit in these observations is the balance of values inherent in the laws of war.
Thus, state's approach to article 23(e) reveals that while states are committed to
humanitarian values, including environmental protection, they have expressed their mutual
QO
obligations in the historic pattern which allows for exercise of discretion to engage in
wartime conduct, not otherwise in flagrant violation of principles, believed under the
circumstances to be justifiable by military necessity.
The final provision under consideration, that concerning enemy property, more clearly
demonstrates the codification of the recognized balance of values within general
conventional expectations By its general terms the provision allows for the primacy of
military considerations, but as previously discussed "military necessity" is not a license for
unbridled destruction. The Gulf War provided the most recent opportunity for the
expression of the general expectation of the international community that belligerents may
not engage in destruction of "enemy property", unless "imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war." While some critics may view the latter qualification as lacking
normative value and essentially a broad loophole for justifying environmentally destructive
warfare activities, 101 the Gulf War experience and legal precedent supports the
proposition that it is more appropriately characterized as a "jus in bello qualification
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which is linked to normal standards of effective military operations rather than aggressive
ambitions or scorched-earth policy." 102 In other words, the "necessities of war" (i.e.
military necessity) is not a carte blanche for indiscriminate destruction of any nature as
apparently engaged in by Iraq. This provision implicitly takes into account the principles
of military economy which dictate, inter alia, that it is imprudent to unnecessarily expand
resources, yours or those of the enemy under your control , in illegitimate military
objectives, objectives which are not reasonably linked with the defeat of the enemy. In
the Hostage Case, the court expounded the limiting nature of the principle of military
necessity, illustrating the legally cognizable balance of values in the context of occupation
activities. The court stated:
Military necessity has been invoked by the defendants as justifying the
killing of innocent members of the population and the destruction of villages
and towns in the occupied territory Military necessity permits a belligerent,
subject to the laws ofwar, to apply any amount and kind offorce to compel
the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of
time, life atid money. In general, it sanctions measures by an occupant ne-
cessary to protect the safety of his forces and to facilitate the success of his
operation It permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other
person whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts
danger, but it does not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes
of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill. The destruction ofproperty
to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities ofwar.
Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law. There
must be some reasonable connection between the destruction ofproperty
and the overcoming of the enemyforces. It is lawful to destroy railways,
lines of communication, or any other property that might be utilized by the
enemy. Private homes and churches even may be destroyed if necessary for
military operations. It does not admit the wanton devastation of a district or
the willful infliction of suffering upon its inhabitants for the sake of suffering
alone (emphasis added).
Hence, article 23(g) protects the environment, again considered in its broadest sense,
as enemy property, to the extent damage is not "imperatively demanded" on the basis of a
"reasonable connection" to the submission of the enemy. As interpreted by the court, the
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Regulations apparently require "that a country engaging in destruction have a degree of
certainty that the particular military act will affect its desired target." 106 Also, the
foreseeable damage must be proportional to the military gains sought to be achieved. This
provision arguably provides substantial protection to the environment when characterized
by its "component parts- that is, property in various forms, such as animal and plant life,
real estate, beaches, and oceans-then determining whether environmental damage exists is
simple." However, deciding whether the damage caused is within the proscribed level
is a difficult and highly debated issue, in other than flagrant violations, and one of the most
problematic issues challenging T& the development of the law of environmental protection
in warfare
The third article under consideration, article 55, clearly elaborates the obligations of an
occupying state relative to "the environment in its component parts" as highlighted by
the court in the Hostage Case It provides as follows:
The occupying State shall be regarded only as the administrator
and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural
estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied coun-
try. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer
them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.
The rules of usufruct permit the occupying state "to enjoy all the advantages derivable
from the use of property which belongs to another state." While allowing for the
beneficial use of the occupied state's resources, the article explicitly obligates the
occupying state to "safeguard the capital of these properties", (e.g. not to cause waste).
The only apparent exception to the obligations imposed by article 55 is "military
necessity". As indicated by the court in the Hostage Case above , military necessity "...
sanctions measures by an occupant necessary to protect the safety of his forces and to
facilitate the success of his operation."
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c. Status of the Environment under Hague law
Although the Regulations do not provide for explicit consideration of the
"environment" in the conduct of hostilities on land, the foregoing discussion demonstrates
that several pertinent articles of the Regulations have legitimate applicability to
environmental protection As illustrated, by codifying customary law doctrines, which
proscribe inflicting unnecessary suffering and destruction of property not "imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war," articles 23 and 55 provide far-reaching protection to
the environment. The Regulations, as observed by Almond, reflect the general
expectations of states that in warfare destruction and human suffering should be kept to its
necessary limits. These expectations have historic and fundamental roots as was
commented by Montesquieo in his epic The Spirit of the Laws: "the Law of nations is
founded on this principle that different nations ought .... in time of war (do to one
in
another) as little injury as possible without prejudicing their real interests".
As illustrated by the Hostage Case supra, and by the unanimous adoption of the
"Nuremberg Principles", as well as by the ongoing efforts to obtain financial
accountability for environmental damage from Iraq, these rules of the laws of war are not
hollow. Moreover, their "prohibitions . . are broad enough to envision the use of any
methods based on any existing or new technology." However, critics of the
Regulations, and thus of customary law, highlight several aspects of the laws normative
structure which raise difficulties and potential for abuse. First, there is the inherent
balancing of interests in which the necessities of war are juxtaposed against other
ambiguously framed principles. Second, the law leaves it up to each belligerent to
exercise prudent discretion to determine the extent of permissible environmental damage.
Nonetheless, in practice states recognize their discretion is not unfettered, that within
the agreed upon parameters, however vaguely stated, there must be a fair winner and an
honorable loser. States generally adhere to the laws of war perhaps out of a deep sense of
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humanitarian convictions and respect for the environment, but also because of the
anticipated ramifications resulting from violations, including the consequences dictated by
the principle of reciprocity. This principle is essential to the effectiveness of the laws of
war as it sanctions in appropriate circumstances reprisals and retortion for illegal conduct
or abuses of rights. While the international community had no grounds to invoke these
law of war remedies against Iraq during the Gulf War, its subsequent demand for
117
accountability, particularly for the environmental damage under Resolution 687, * serves
to reinforce the principle that wartime destruction is subject to the "reasonable
connection" test underlying the principle of military necessity, as discussed in the Hostage
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Case. Prosecutions such as the Hostage Case although too rare, and the ongoing
process to hold Iraq accountable is part of the inter-state process of enforcement
underlying the dynamic normative structure of the laws of war. This state-driven
process is explained by von Glahn as follows:
Each particular instance . . must therefore be judged on its own merits.
If honest conviction and corroborating factual evidence can be marshaled
in support of a given application of (military necessity), well and good, but
if it can be shown that dire urgency did not exist or that the violation
undertaken did not materially and immediately contribute to military success,
then any tribunal judging the case on hand would be bound to rule that a
i ?o
war crime had been committed.
2. The Geneva Tradition
a Overview
The egregious violations of "human rights" during World War II, and the lack of
precision and clarity in the laws of war as exemplified by war crime cases such as the
Hostage Case, provided momentum to pre-war initiatives for further development of
• • 1 22
the jus in bello, particularly with regard to the treatment of war victims. Z,Z" The Hague
Regulations, which primarily focused on the means and methods of warfare, had simply
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incorporated by reference the Geneva law as the applicable law dealing with the sick and
1 23
wounded. Thus, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 were the culmination of
efforts, primarily on the part of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to
supplement and cure the normative shortcomings of the 1907 Hague Conventions and
elaborate the existing Geneva law. 4 These in turn were supplemented in 1977 by two
protocols. Protocol I, which is concerned with international armed conflict and protocol
II, which elaborates Article 3 Common of the four Conventions, relating to "armed
conflict not of an international character." iz:> The four Geneva Conventions enjoy wide
acceptance by states and are viewed as normative by the international community
generally, thus "it is reasonable to assume that the Conventions are (at least in large part)
declaratory of customary international law. This is particularly the case in respect of the
general principles contained therein" The Geneva Conventions, like their Hague
Regulations counterparts, do not provide for explicit environmental protection. However,
the Fourth Geneva Convention provisions considered below, likewise afford the
environment indirect protection by prohibiting excessive wartime destruction. Moreover,
as we will note the Geneva regime provides for enforcement of the legal obligations
imposed by conventional law Finally, we consider Protocol I provisions which explicitly
provide for environmental protection in armed conflict, specifically articles 35 and 55,
which essentially merged Hague law, concerning means and methods prohibitions, with
Geneva law, the protection of war victims. We will briefly compare Protocol I with the
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques (ENMOD), noting the context of applicability, including the
issues relating to the threshold of prohibited environmental damage.
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b. Geneva Convention IV
Articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention are particularly relevant to
environmental protection. Article 53, for example, parallels the provisions of articles
46 and 55 of the Hague Regulations, concerning the obligations of an occupying state.
It provides:
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property
belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State,
or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is
prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely nece-
1 90
ssary by military operations.
The Geneva provisions similarly have been considered inadequate vis-a-vis protection of
the environment because of their "narrow purpose" and limited scope of applicability.
The nature of the occupying state's obligation relative to the environment was previously
discussed in connection with Hague Regulation, article 55, supra. However, for our
purposes we should note that states explicitly continued the traditional balance of interests
by reserving the right to cause "destruction . . . rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations " Additionally, reflecting the stark realities of war, not even the presence of
protected persons may foreclose the destruction of "points or areas" deemed proper
ill
military targets. It should be recalled that this discretion to take measures required by
"military necessity" is not a carte blanche. In this regard, the Geneva Conventions went a
step further by explicitly providing for legal sanctions for violators by elaborating an
enforcement mechanism to deter and redress violations of the law.
In contrast to Hague Convention IV which provided solely for state responsibility for
violations of the Regulations, the four Geneva Conventions, under common articles
49/50/129/146 respectively, provide for individual criminal responsibility, under which
Parties are obligated to prosecute violators for acts identified as "grave breaches".
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Further, states agree to "take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts "not
considered "grave breaches". The enforcement regime essentially relies on the political
will of the Parties, but there is a strict obligation to enact legislation imposing "effective
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed," the acts defined as
133
"grave breaches." Presently, there are two conventional provisions which define acts
encompassing environmental damage as "grave breaches". First, common articles
50/51/130/147 of the four Geneva Conventions respectively, explicitly include "willfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,... and extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly." Thus, environmental damage which may not be sufficiently "extensive"
may still be actionable if willfully caused with reasonable certainty that it would lead to
"great suffering or serious injury to body or health" to persons (or property) protected by
the Conventions. The second provision is found in Protocol I and prohibits "launching an
indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge
that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects." Essentially, these two provisions reinforce the customary principle of
discrimination, which requires belligerents to attack only legitimate military objectives, and
the principle of immunity of the civilian population also implicit in the St. Petersburg
Declaration's mandate that "the only legitimate object ... is to weaken the. . enemy." 1
Finally, consistent with article 3 of the Hague Convention, the Geneva Conventions, by




Protocol I illustrates the evolutionary character of the laws of armed conflict in relation
to socio-political forces. In consonance with the prevailing socio-political attitudes of
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the international community in the early 1970's, the Protocol's ground-breaking
environmental law of war provisions reflect two seemingly irreconcilable legal approaches
to environmental protection in wartime: protection of the environment per se and
protection of the environment because it is directly connection with traditional
humanitarian law objectives, to minimize destruction and protect non-belligerents.
However, a critical look at Protocol I environmental provisions, while revealing a shift of
states' attitudes in line with the contemporary trend to accord the environment greater
protection, demonstrates a normative structure which is, with several exceptions of
significance to the environment, consistent with the "overriding paradigm governing the
laws of war
. . . (which) flows from international customary law" and the Hague
codifications discussed above. In other words, although the Protocol progressively
developed the jus in bello to explicitly include environmental impacts of wartime
activities, the "new law" of Protocol I does not appear to significantly alter the deeply
entrenched state-centered value system in which the security of the state and measures
necessary for successful military operations enjoy higher precedence in the hierarchy of
values. Specifically, articles 35(3) and 55, while affording direct environmental
protection in sweeping terms, provide for an ambiguous threshold of prescribed damage
that for all practical purposes defer to state's discretion analogous to the principle of
military necessity, although neither makes reference to this principle. Article 35,
appearing under the section on "Methods and Means of Warfare", sets forth the "Basic
rules", thus signaling the fundamental importance, at least in principle, attached to the
environmental provision therein. The article restates the principles of limitation,
proportionality and humanity, explicitly affirming the customary law that there is no
unlimited right to choose means or methods to injure the enemy, and the duty of avoid
causing "superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering". Under subsection (3), again stating
a "basic rule", it provides: "It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which
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are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to
the natural environment." 142 Article 55(1), which appears in the chapter concerning
protection of "Civilian Objects", employs similar language, as follows:
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a
prohibition of the use ofmethods or means of warfare which are intended
or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and
thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population. 143
The operative terms "widespread", "long-term" and "severe" are also employed, with
slight variation, in the ENMOD Convention. However, as noted by Leibler, there are
three significant differences between the Convention and the Protocol which affect the
scope of and mechanisms for ensuring environmental protection:
(1) The Convention prohibits acts which have "widespread, long-lasting or severe"
effects, while the Protocol prohibits acts which have "widespread, long-term and severe"
effects. This means that under the Convention, any one of the described effects separately
is prohibited, but under the Protocol they must be cumulative.
(2) Under the Convention, environmental modification must be carried out "as the
means" of destruction or damage. The Protocol, however, prohibits methods which "may
be expected" to cause damage. In other words, the prohibition in the Convention is
directed at deliberate environmental damage only, whereas the Protocol extends to
objectively foreseeable collateral effects.
(3) The Convention was created within the framework of International
Environmental Law, whereas the Protocol is part of the Law of Warfare. This is a critical
distinction
. . . because responsibility under the Law of Warfare entail far more severe
consequences than it does under International Environmental Law.
As usually occurs in difficult negotiations involving international agreements, the best
result is often achievable by broad and ambiguous language, which accommodates the
vital interests of heterogeneous states. Protocol I, appears to be no exception to the
general draftsmanship practices encountered in international accords. The operative
terms highlighted above were not defined either in the Protocol or by collateral
Understandings, as was attempted under the ENMOD Convention. 4/ As noted by
Ambassador Aldrich, "(e)ach of these provisions proved very difficult to negotiate, and the
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resulting texts are often less clear than the subjects deserve." 148 During the Diplomatic
Conferences, for example, the following diverse views "explaining" the meaning of the
element "long-term" were recorded by Committee III:
(It) was considered by some (delegates) to be measured in decades.
Reference to twenty or thirty years was made by some representatives
as being a minimum. Others referred to battlefield destruction in France
in the First World War as being outside the scope of the prohibition. . . It
appeared to be a widely shared assumption that battlefield damage




d. Status of the Environment under Geneva law
The foregoing discussion highlights the limitations of Protocol I, the most recent effort
by states to update Geneva law to reflect contemporary values concerning environmental
protection The Protocol's limitations arise in part from the impregnable threshold issue of
what is the "natural environment", which states have not yet found a common ground for
definition in the context of conventional law More importantly and problematic has been
the issue of defining a precise threshold of prohibited environmental damage. The former
was not defined at all, though there is general accord with the ICRC's approach to view
the term in its broadest sense, to include the human environment. The broad language of
Protocol I with respect to the triggering threshold of prohibited damage, on the other
hand, reflects a political choice seemingly consistent with the general approach of states to
the laws of war. ° As exemplified by the Turkish Interpretative Statement to ENMOD,
unable to reach agreement on specific obligations relating to the quantum of damage
permissible, states explicitly reject narrow interpretations and assert the right to conduct
military activities as permitted by traditional law of war principles. Thus, in view of the
Committee's report and the Declarations of governments severely limiting the scope of the
articles prohibitions, leading commentators have echoed the general assessment that
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articles 35(3) and 55 do "not impose any significant limitation on combatants waging
conventional warfare It seems primarily directed to high level policy decision maker and
would affect such unconventional means of warfare as the massive use of herbicides or
chemical agents which could produce widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment. JZ Hence, absent an international consensus on the threshold of
damage proscribe by the operative terms, and the fact that it has not been widely ratified
and thus not reflective of customary law, it appears that Protocol I has limited efficacy in
directly protecting the environment. lj:> Consequently, "the earlier rules, especially those




C. Applicability to the Environment
The Geneva Convention IV, in concert with the Hague Regulations discussed supra,
both reflective of customary law, are therefore the major substantive basis for proscribing
wanton environmental destruction, however defined, as apparently engaged in by Iraq.
However, because the existing normative framework did not deter Iraq's assault on the
environment, there have been suggestions for new conventional law specifically geared to
protecting the environment during armed conflict Professor Plant posits that one reason
for new conventional law "governing the laws of war and the environment is the
desirability of updating the law of war to reflect major developments in international
environmental law as it applies in time of peace. Changes in state practice and the
adoption of a large number of international environmental law instruments since the 1970s
have reinforced the establishment or imminent emergence of a number of principles of
customary international law. ^ We now turn to consideration of environmental law
developments to assess the normative status of existing or emerging principles which have
relevance in the context of wartime relations of states.
31

IV. Environmental Law Norms
1. Overview
Environmental law is a relatively new development in international law. It has evolved
dramatically in the last several decades in response to the peacetime environmental
problems and concerns of increasingly economically interdependent states challenged by
rapid global industrialization and development. Since 1972 there has been a steady
stream of international environmental instruments which have elaborated or codified
norms of relevance to state wartime activities. One difficulty in evaluating their
authoritative value in the context of warfare lies in the multiplicity of political-legal
instruments promulgated by various internationally significant organizations Many of
these instruments are not legally binding in the classical sense, but under contemporary
norm-building mechanisms may not be easily dismissed as not expressing the normative
values of the international community. Also, with the exception of ENMOD,
environmental conventional law has been conspicuously silent regarding the status of the
environment/?^ se in armed conflict. Consequently, as previously stated, the nature and
scope of existing obligations as between belligerents, and other international actors (e.g.
neutral states, international organizations) under contemporary environmental norms is not
1 ss
yet settled, and is one area noted for further international discourse. The current
trend in this regard is "that peacetime obligations apply in principle also in wartime,
subject to the application of the laws of war, and that they remain fully applicable to the
relations between Belligerent and neutral third parties." 1 Moreover, there are
conventional obligations encompassing the environment, some having the status of
customary law, which arguably impose constraints upon belligerents regardless of their
involvement in a conflict. For example, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. 16
Likewise, state practice may ratify peacetime environmental customary norms to an extent
applicable to wartime activities under a Martens Clause rationale, and thereby impose
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obligations subject to general principles of international state responsibility. 161 It is,
however, beyond the scope of the present undertaking to visit in detail these diverse but
related issues. They are mentioned here to underscore that this is an area of international
law undergoing the fascinating and dynamic process of development and clarification. 162
Below we will simply trace the nature of environmental law developments to attempt to
gain insight into general trends which undoubtedly will influence the future development
of the law of environmental protection in armed conflict.
2. Stockholm Declaration: Principle 21
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration is widely viewed as the fountainhead of the
environmental law stream. It marks a "new era of environmental consciousness among
nations", and the beginning of environmental law as a distinct branch of international
law. The following excerpt from its preamble provides a glimpse of the "new
consciousness" and the scope of the emergent transcultural attitude towards the
environment:
A point has been reached in history when we must shape our actions
throughout the world with a more prudent care for their environmental
consequences Through ignorance or indifference we can do massive and
irreversible harm to the earthly environment on which our life and well-being
depend Conversely, through fuller knowledge and wiser action, we can
achieve for ourselves and our posterity a better life in an environment more
in keeping with human needs and hopes. There are broad vistas for the
enhancement of environmental quality and the creation of a good life
To defend and improve the human environment for present and future
generations has become an imperative goal of mankind—a goal to be
pursued together with, and in harmony with, the established and funda-
mental goals of peace and of worldwide economic and social development.
Implicit in the foregoing is the "basic percept of international environmental
protection,.
. . the principle of limitation,. ... the idea that the right of human beings to
use, or abuse, the environment is not unlimited, . . a relatively new phenomenon."
Although it is a non-binding instrument, the Declaration's "soft-law" status is politically
33

significant, and it has in fact contributed to the clarification of customary law norms. 168
Specifically, Principle 21, concerning state responsibility for transboundary pollution,
affirmed and extended the peacetime environmental "doctrine of limitation", 169
memorialized as a keystone principle of international environmental law in the landmark
decision of the Trial Smelter Arbitration. 1 70 Principle 21, as was the Trial Smelter case,
is grounded on the "traditional regime of State Responsibility" which requires reparations
for a "significant" harm arising from the breach of an international obligation. 1 ' 1
Principle 2 1 supports limitation of and reparations for wartime environmental damage by
codifying customary law principles as follows:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nation and
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsi-
bility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.
'
In comparison to the Trial Smelter principle, Principle 21 extends liability of states for
"damage to the environment ..(of) areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." Thus,
pollution to areas within the global commons, such as the high seas, presumably provides
1 71
a basis for reparations to the international community. The key issue for our inquiry is
to what extent the Principle has applicability to wartime activities. The Declaration is
fundamentally a political document which was entangled in the politics surrounding the
Vietnam Conflict. It was shaped by contemporaneous political sensitives which made it
impracticable to include wartime environmental impacts among its principles. However,
Stockholm was the catalyst for subsequent conventional developments, including the




Nonetheless, considering the general terms of Principle 21 and the current trend to
apply peacetime obligations to belligerent relations, we can not presumptively preclude its
application to "significant" wartime environmental damage, particularly to the environment
of neutral states and the global commons. 5 Application of the principle for "wrongful"
wartime damage would also appear to be consistent with the analogous laws of war
principle of limitation, as well as the I.C.J, holding in the Corfu Channel case, which
supports the proposition that states have a good faith duty to avoid causing damages to
other states, and to notify them of reasonably foreseeable hazards, an evolving norm in
environmental law as suggested by contemporary conventional developments.
Leibler suggests that in most conflicts the Trial Smelter principle as codified by
Principle 21, would result in state liability for wrongful wartime environmental damage
1 77
unless three criteria were shown. To preclude a finding of wrongfulness a state must
1 TO
be exercising its legal right to use force (i.e. self-defense) and commit the
environmentally damaging act under "duress" or "necessity". "Duress" is established if
there was no other means of saving lives and the act was proportional to the risks
presented While "necessity" permits the damage in order to secure "an essential interest
of the state against a grave and imminent peril." Necessity also requires that the act "not
seriously impair an essential interest" of the target state. Establishing these "special
circumstances" will be difficult for states, thus Leibler acknowledges that the possibility of
having to pay reparations after the fact is not a satisfactory deterrent for states not to
1 80
engage in conduct detrimental to the environment during the war.
Moreover, a potential obstacle to application of Principle 2 1 to wartime environmental
pollution is raised by the rule proposed by Article 26 of the ILC's draft articles on
"International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by
International Law," which provides that "there shall be no liability ... if the harm was
directly due to an act of war (or) hostilities." 18 * The future shape of this proposed
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convention may influence the extent to which Principle 21 applies to wartime
environmental pollution. Give its customary law status, however, it would appear that
Principle 21 is yet another sources for a belligerent's duty not to unduly damage the
environment so as to inflict "significant" harm to other states, including its opponent, or
the global commons. Since it essentially embraces the peacetime principle of limitation,
which parallels the analogous law of war principle of limitation, it also provides a viable
theory for reparations for "significant" pollution, especially for neutral states, who may
also rely on the customary rule of territorial immunity codified by Article 1 of Hague
Convention V. ] 82
Regrettably, the Security Council's lack of specificity in Resolution 687 fails to
contribute to clarification of legal rights under environmental law norms, but the broad
language of the Resolution requiring Iraq pay compensation for environmental damage is
an important precedent, as is the established mechanism to enforce state responsibility for
1 81
such damage arising out of illegal wartime conduct. The compensation regime
established by the Resolution provides a much needed forum for states to "co-operate to
develop further the international law regarding liability and compensation for the victims
of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or
1 84
control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction." Hence, the present
authoritative status of Principle 2 1 , as the embodiment of the environmental peacetime
principle of limitation, in the context of armed conflict is not all together clear, and
because of its intrinsic similarity to the wartime principle of limitation may be in any event





While compensation is the traditional remedy for breach of an international obligation,
for environmental damage it is often an inadequate remedy. Thus, there is a discernible
trend reflected in international environmental instruments to instill a precautionary
approach to human activities to further the goals of resource conservation and
minimization of environmental damage, taking into account states' present economic
interests and human needs, as well as the interests of future generations. These goals
and ideals, which are subordinate to states' sovereign rights to manage and use natural
resources within their territories, were explicitly embraced in the Stockholm Declaration
and are the fundamental tenets underscoring subsequent environmental law developments.
In particular, they have been echoed in General Assembly and other inter-governmental
resolutions and declarations, which also specifically touched upon the environmental
impacts of war or war related activities
The 1980 General Assembly Resolution proclaiming the Historical Responsibility of
States for the Protection of Nature, for example, noted "that the continuation of the arms
race, including the use of various types of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, and the
accumulation of toxic chemicals are adversely affecting the human environment and
damaging the vegetable and animal world The Resolution called on states to
consider these implications of the arms race and cooperate in measures to preserve nature
on the planet
The World Charter for Nature, which may be characterized as the General Assembly's
environmental manifesto, and considered internationally as elaborating "soft-law"
principles, provides as a General Principle that: "Nature shall be secured against
degradation caused by warfare or other hostile activities." Principle 20, the implementing
1 OQ
principle, "mandates" that: "Military activities damaging to nature shall be avoided."
The 1992 Rio Conference of heads of states, with the recent Gulf War experience as a
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back drop, heighten these cultural and legal expectation by embracing Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration, and announcing Rio's Principle 24, that: "Warfare is inherently
destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international law
providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its
further development, as necessary.
4 Cultural Norms and Environmental Law
This brief overview of major non-binding environmental instruments, demonstrates
that cultural norms in favor of environmental protection in wartime are truly transnational
Hence, naturally world public opinion was overwhelmingly indignant of Iraq's
environmental tactics, especially since it apparently had doubtful military value, as
required by existing international law. States by participating widely in these elaborations
of Principles and condemning deviant state behavior, and for the most part endorsing
major General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions, such as Resolution 687, have
manifested a measure of commitment to protect the environment within the framework of
international law, a commitment in consonance with and instigated by prevailing cultural
attitudes of states' national constituencies. Although the environmental instruments
discussed supra are not legally binding in the traditional sense, they nonetheless carry a
qualitative measure of normative status because they generate political expectations of
compliance with the "soft-law" obligations stated therein These expectations to the
extent they are reinforced by conforming state practice solidifying their normative status.
Hence, this aspect of contemporary state behavior which essentially flows from a "sense
of obligation or sense of being bound" has been described as one source of norms in the
modern norm-building process. 192 Judge Guttal explains: "International law is law
because it creates binding obligations. Binding norms emanate from the actions and




General Assembly." This, of course, is one dimension of the very complex and diverse
international law-making process. However, it has been a vital fountain of international
environmental law, which has substantially developed via "soft-law" instruments. This
method of norm-building is more politically palatable for states than traditional "hard-law"
treaty obligations, permitting elaboration of general principles and broad obligations which
allow for flexible responses to the uncertainties encountered in the quagmire of
environmental issues.
Moreover, not only have cultural norms favoring environmental protection been
enshrined in the numerous Resolutions and Declarations, "(e)nvironmental protection is
seen as an obligation to be enforced not simply because it is in an individual state's best
interest, but because it benefits the broader interests of the community of states."
Thus, states have been motivated to develop conventional law covering such diverse
subjects as world climate change, protection of the ozone layer, long-range transboundary
air pollution, the protection of the marine environment under the Convention on the Law
of the Sea, and the protection of treasured and irreplaceable cultural property. A
cursory look at these instruments, however, reveals that binding obligations are for the
most part also characterized in broad and ambiguous terms analogous to the "soft-law"
obligations, again reflecting states' desire for flexibility to adjust policies to the
uncertainties of complex environmental phenomena.
Part V. Conclusion
1 Law of Armed Conflict and Environmental Protection: The Present Balance
Notwithstanding the vital common interests leading to the aforementioned specific
conventional undertakings, and the hortatory mandates of "soft-law" instruments
proclaiming protection of the environment a fundamental international public policy
intricately linked with major community goals, 197 states have yet to develop or codify
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comprehensive conventional law to directly protect the environment during armed conflict.
The inherent frictions in cultural values and contradictory state policy goals in the
context of environmental impacts of warfare, have been resolved by giving precedence to
the long-standing customary principles of the laws of war, as codified by Hague law and
Geneva law, and progressively developed by ENMOD, the Inhumane Weapons
Convention and Protocol I
Although a case may be made that the laws of war promote to some degree the four
policy goals enumerated by Captain Winter, the laws of war built-in bias is to further
states' individual policy interests in warfare, namely defeating the enemy, while allowing
for reasonable collateral adverse effects to the global commons and environmental
interests of other states Although the "overriding paradigm governing the laws of
war "^ is not a carte blanche for wanton destruction of any nature, the Hostage Case
affirmed it affords considerable latitude for military operations reasonably connected with
defeating the opponent Conduct inconsistent with the laws of war, as codified in the
Hague Regulations and Geneva IV, simply allows the victim to seek reparations and the
states to prosecute for "grave breaches." This historical balance of values and interests
embraced by the modern jus &a\ bello was ratified by the actions of its principal subjects
and creators, the "community of states", in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The debate
concerning the illegitimacy of Iraq's environmental damage, putting aside Iraq's
unprecedented blatant violation of the U.N- Charter's jus ad bello provisions as a
peremptory basis, took place principally within the framework of jus in bello
principles.
In brief, the existing jus in bello framework censured Iraq's actions because the
foreseeable damage was disproportionate to the marginal military advantage, and because
it seemingly was purely spiteful acts of misplaced "reprisals" in the face of military defeat
The pollution of the Persian Gulf and destruction of hundreds of oil-well heads simply
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could not be justified by any stretch of the principle of military necessity. International
environmental law played but a peripheral part, as it is virtually devoid of explicit norms
pertinent to wartime activities. The ENMOD Convention, had Iraq been a Party, would
not have been triggered since "Iraq's actions only affected the climate and natural
processes, they did not use the environment as a weapon," which is the gravamen of the
Convention.203
Hence, the damage to the natural environment was condemned in the court of world
opinion because it was inimical to the community's interests to protect and conserve the
natural environment, including conservation of resources and the global commons. The
outrage expressed was a manifestation of contemporary cultural attitudes echoed in
environmental law instruments, which recognize the fundamental value of the
environment, from an anthropocentric as well as biocentric perspective The substantive
legal framework for declaring the environmental damage illegal under international law,
however, was furnished by the modern international legal regime embodied in the United
Nations Charter, which embraces in a systemic sense the laws of war, customary as well as
conventional.
The unprecedented institutional response by the Security Council under Chapter VII,
authorizing military force to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait, and its imposition of
political and financial accountability for damage to the environment under Resolution
6g7 204 demonstrated the effective potential of the Charter regime as envisage by the
Framers. Additionally, General Assembly involvement also demonstrated a broader
institutional, as well as global, response to wartime environmental damage. By adopting
numerous Resolutions and encouraging ICRC initiatives on the subject, particularly
Resolution 47/37, ^ states exhibited their disposition on the issue. Although Resolution
47/37 is nonbinding, it reflects and reinforces normative expectations by affirming existing
customary principles and rules of international law zu Significantly, the Resolution
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demonstrates the predominate disposition in the "community of states" regarding the legal
approach to environmental protection during armed conflict. The Resolution explicitly
embraced Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration, 'reaffirming the general environmental
values implicit in state's obligations to promote the fundamental international goals
relative to environmental protection. However, it also ratified the existing balance of
values by explicitly subjecting environmental protection to the existing normative
framework of the laws of war. In this regard, the General Assembly stressed the
importance of existing law, specifically "the rules of universal applicability laid down" in
Hague Convention IV, Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention IV, and the
"applicable rules" of Protocol I and ENMOD. The Resolution thus declared the Gulf
pollution and oil-well head destruction a violation of "provisions of international law
prohibiting such acts. . . Stressing that destruction of the environment, not justified by
military necessity and carried out wantonly, is clearly contrary to existing international
/mi." 208 (emphasis added)
Cognizant of the historical record of incidents of "overreaching" by states at war, with
disastrous consequences to the environment and human beings, the General Assembly
encouraged the ICRC to continue with initiatives to explore ways of improving the law of
environmental protection in armed conflict, particularly the development of a
handbook of model guidelines for use in military manuals The Resolution also
promulgated the following four recommendations, which underscore the future
developmental challenges for the jus in hello as it evolves to strengthened the regime of
environmental protection during armed conflicts:
1
.
Urges States to take all measures to ensure compliance with the existing international
law applicable to the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict;




3. Urges States to take steps to incorporate the provisions of international law applicable
to the protection of the environment into their military manuals and to ensure that they are
effectively disseminated,
4. Requests the Secretary-General to invite the International Committee of the Red Cross
to report on activities undertaken by the Committee and other relevant bodies with regard
to the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict, and to submit to the
General Assembly at its forty-eighth session, under the item entitled "United Nations
Decade of International Law", a report on activities reported by the Committee.
2. Future Prospects for The Law of Environmental Protection in War
Given the current predisposition of states, even after the Gulf War experience, that the
fundamental goal of environmental protection is best achieved under the existing
normative framework of the laws of war, we now turn to the questions posed at the outset
of our inquiry. Is the environment adequately protected by existing law or is new
conventional law on wartime environmental protection needed9 From the standpoint of
progressively developing international law to achieve greater protection for the
environment in armed conflict, the best perspective to both parts of the question is a
qualified no.
Our discussion of the existing normative framework and specific norms relevant to
environmental protection reveals a need for clarification and further development of norms
and enforcement mechanisms to strengthen constraints on belligerent's conduct
detrimental to the environment. For example, the challenge of elaborating what is
encompassed by the prohibition in Protocol I not to cause "widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environment" and the ongoing process to hold Iraq
accountable. Also, as indicated in Resolution 47/37 not all states have become parties to
relevant treaties and some lag behind in implementing mechanisms to ensure compliance
with existing obligations However, new conventional law specifically geared to war's
environmental impacts and correction of existing deficiencies does not at this time appear
feasible due to lack of state interest. In any event, we may be misdirecting scarcff
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resources on efforts for new conventional law, as the process of its development is
complicated by conceptual problems equivalent to those underlying the existing normative
21
1
structure/' 1 For example, how is the "environment" going to be defined and how will
the prescribed quantum of environmental damage be determined? The ICRC Report
succinctly framed the fundamental threshold issues in the context of Protocol I articles
35(3) and 55 as follows: "Indeed, damage to the environment is unavoidable in war. The
point at issue, therefore, is where to set the threshold."212 The available resources can
perhaps be more efficiently directed at improving the existing international legal regime,
which will concurrently promote the goals of both branches of international law by
addressing the problems underscored by Resolution 47/37.
Moreover, the international community by adopting the laws of war principles as the
guidelines for environmental protection in wartime, acquiesces in the inevitability of
environmental damage However, it has heretofore avoided or has been unable to
elaboration a finite formula to determine reasonable damage. States have made the
political choice, via long-standing and recently ratified authoritative decisions, to condone
military operations consistent with the principles of war, with complete awareness that
environmental damage may be caused to neutral states and the global commons The
reasonableness of each specific case is judged on its own merits by a state-driven process
of scrutiny and accountability, based on the framework of the laws of war and general
principles of international state and individual responsibility
A comprehensive convention on wartime environmental protection would be the ideal
approach given the contemporary trend in environmental law to accord the environment
protection against a wide-spectrum of human activity. However, the "community of
states" is far from ideal and is not presently amenable to a conventional approach
recognizing "nature's right" to the detriment of the "necessities of war". This is due in part
because a restrictive environmental wartime regime is perceived as inimical to states'
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distinct policy objectives, including the inherent right to take reasonable and necessary
military measures in self-defense. * 4 Thus, states make up an intrinsically political
community, which at present is not motivated, lacking the requisite socio-political
climate, to undertake the difficult task of developing such a convention.
Developments in international law clearly demonstrate that states are fully cognizant of
the vital importance of the environment to a broad-range of human needs and interests,
and the hazards presented by warfare. But their approach to binding commitments in
favor of environmental protection has been generally gradual, cautious, and tentative.
States' hesitancy to enter into concrete obligations relating to the environment in the
context of warfare was strikingly illustrated by the highly qualified obligations of article
35(3), Protocol I and the attitudes of state representatives documented by Committee III
relative to the interpretation of the element "long-term".
Nonetheless, environmental protection in armed conflict and strengthening the
mechanisms to achieve that goal is clearly an important common objective for states, as
reflected by the General Assembly's inclusion of this issue under its "Decade of
International Law" agenda Thus the ongoing process of developing the jus in bello has
certainly not escaped the influence of contemporary cultural values encompassed in
international environmental law. The challenge for international law is to strike a balance
which harmonizes the friction of values inherent in the laws of war and environmental law.
Since wars will likely continue to color inter-state relations, the goal is tfc to develop, or
clarify existing norms, to explicitly promote "environmentally friendly" approaches in the
conduct of armed conflict. Are there or should there be limits to military necessity in
order to achieve an acceptable degree of explicit environmental protection?
The path to harmonization may be cleared by the similar philosophies embraced by the
two branches of international law 215 As noted above, both share an essentially
analogous principle of limitation and they promote the community's value of conservation.
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"Specifically, the laws of war conserve military forces and battlefield surroundings, while
environmental laws conserve environmental resources. The mandates of conservation in
both of these contexts are directed against mindless exploitation and destruction. 1° The
fact that the process toward harmonization is taking place within the existing normative
framework is reflected by Resolution 47/37, which reaffirms states' obligations under
existing international law to consider environmental impacts of warfare activities This
state behavior is part of the authoritative decision-process, which over time assimilates the
cultural values of the "recognized social forces of the time" into legal norms. Thus,
the balance attained between community environmental policies and the policies of
individual states concenrabout sovereign rights in wartime, is a critical factor in the future
development of favorableyws in hello environmental norms.
Hence, the laws of war normative framework and its evolution must be considered as a
component of the broader modern international legal system, embodied in the United
Nations Charter The deficiencies underscored by the recommendations of Resolution
47/37 are too common to other branches of the legal system Hence, in order to realize
the goal of environmental protection in armed conflict, as defined by the authoritative
decision-making process, by strengthening compliance with the laws of war, we must
concurrently strengthen the modern international institutional structure created by the
U.N. Charter. In this manner we will elevate the credibility of international law generally
and institutionalize the concept of the "rule of law" as a peremptory norm to be observed
by states. There is in this respect much work to be done to achieve the worthy goal of a
world order under the Charter regime, based on respect for the community law. The fact
that Iraq blatantly disregarded, as other states have done, the obligations of the Charter
tells us systemic adjustments are in order. Obviously, in the contemporary state-system




Exploring these important issues and developments is beyond the scope of the present
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effort.^ 10 However, a quick glance at the record of activities documented in the U.N.
Yearbooks, and the recent global commitments undertaken by the United Nations,
particularly enforcing the Law of the Charter against Iraq, reveals that the "community of
states" has stepped up to the plate to face the challenges of the post-Cold War Era to
attempt to shape a better world order. iy Its role in international life is magnanimous.
While the United Nations has not always performed to the highest expectations, as the
leading universal governmental body it is the appropriate forum for striking the value
balances most conducive to peace and sustainable development.
Hence, of the available avenues, developing the "new" world order under the law of the
U.N. Charter certainly seems to be the reasoned and prudent approach to environmental
protection in peacetime, as well as in the hopefully increasingly rare armed conflicts which
may occur under a more cohesive world legal order Anarchy and global political
polarization obviously are not in the best interests of mankind and law-abiding, peace-
i • 220
loving nations should resist the efforts of any nation bend on "going its own way" In
the evolving Charter regime, sovereign rights, peacetime or wartime based, will
necessarily have to be redefined especially when they unreasonably and adversely impact
the global environment to the detriment of the community interests Striking a balance
between these values more favorable to environmental protection in wartime is a
substantial, but not impossible, developmental challenge for international law. Although
states are not presently inclined to alter the traditional laws of war regime, the undertaking
to explore the issue is an essential part of the laws evolutionary development. In time
environmental interests may take precedence over less pressing wartime interests.
However, global institutional stability is a fundamental precondition for achieving lasting
peace, sustainable development consistent with environmental conservation, and a fair and
221
equitable world order, the major goals and aspirations of the international community.
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1 McDougal posits that law is a process of authoritative decisions, encompassing
"constitutive and particular public order decisions", based on shared community
expectations. This process is not static as community values change over time. Thus
viewed, international law is just one dimension of a larger "community process" which
reflects a choice of alternatives of relevant decision-makers. The objective of this process
being the attainment of a level of international public order. See Myres S. McDougal,
Jurisprudence For a Free Society, 1 Ga L. Rev. 1, 4-5, 14 (1966). McDougal described
the international law-making process in the context of the law of the sea as follows:
From the perspective of realistic description, the international law of the sea is
not a mere static body of rules but is rather a whole decision-making process, a
public order which includes a structure of authorized decision-makers as well as a
body of highly flexible, inherited prescriptions. It is in other words, a process of con-
tinuous interaction, of continuous demand and response, in which the decision-
makers of particular nation states unilaterally put forward claims of the most
diverse and conflicting character to the use of the world's seas, and in which
other decision-makers, external to the demanding state and including both
national and international officials, weigh and appraise these competing claims
in terms of the interests of the world community and of the rival claimants, and
ultimately accept or reject them. As such a process, it is a living, growing
law, grounded in the practices and sanctioning expectations of nation-state
officials, and changing as their demands and expectations are changed by the
exigencies of new interests and technology and by other continually evolving
conditions in the world arena
Editorial Comment: The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the Internationa/ Law of the Sea,
49 Am. J Int'l L 356-359 (1955) reprinted in Henry J. Steiner et. al , Transnational
Legal Problems, 262 (4th ed., 1994)(hereinafter Legal Problems) See also, Christopher
D Stone, The law as aforce in shaping cultural norms relating to war and environment,
in Cultural Norms, War and the Environment, 64, 65-66 (Arthur H Westing, ed.)
(1988)(hereinafter, Shaping cultural norms) (suggesting that "the conception of laws as
mere reflectors of cultural norms grasps only half the dynamic ...In the international arena,
too, there are instances in which laws and law-making can be regarded not as the product
of pre-existing norms, but also rather as an integral part of the process of norm
development and substantiation."
2
I will refer to the laws of armed conflict interchangeably with the traditional terms "laws
of war", "humanitarian law" and jus in bello. The former is a more contemporary term
which is used widely in discussions and modern conventions. The term armed conflict
also encompasses situations other than the traditional state to state conflict, including
measures short of full-blown hostilities and uses of force by non-state actors whose
conduct under modern doctrines may be subject to the restraints imposed by the laws
applicable to armed hostilities. See generally Karl Josef Partsch, Armed Conflict, in 3
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Encyclopedia of Public International Law 25, 26 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed , 1982) (discussing
the evolution of the term "armed conflict" and its essential differences from the term
"war").
These terms do not have generally recognized definitions in international law. The
substantive definitions of these terms, as we will notice in relevant documents, and of
related terms such as "human environment" and "environmental damage", may be
classified into three categories: 1 ) "human-centric" , where the environment is defined in
terms of its relation to human; particularly its social and economic dimension; 2) "nature-
centric" definitions which focus purely on environment factors, such as its processes or
identifiable elements, and 3) definitions that combine elements of each of the above.
David Tolbert, Defining the "Environment", in Environmental Protection and the Law of
War: A 'Fifth Geneva' Convention on the Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed
Conflict, 257-259, G. Plant ( 1 992)(hereinafter Environmental Protection). The
definitional problem of what is the "environment" and how it is defined is a significant and
most difficult threshold issue underlying the development of the laws under consideration
Detail consideration of this issue is beyond our present scope. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
,
for instance, in its Commentary on Protocol I,
views thai, term "natural environment" used in Articles 35(3) and 55, discussed infra Part
III, 2 (2)(2), in its "widest sense to cover not merely objects indispensable to the survival
of the human population, such as foodstuffs,..., but also forests and other vegetation... as
well as flora, fauna and other biological and climatic elements." Michael A. Meyer, A
Definition of the 'Environment', in Environmental Protection, supra at 255. Since the
ultimate goal of humanitarian law is to minimize the destructiveness of warfare, both on
the natural environment and the human beings who are a part of it, the author shares the
view that these terms should be understood in their broadest sense so as to lead to their
broad application thereby being conducive to the goal of humanitarian law. This premise
underlies the use of these terms herein and no attempt is made to achieve a precise
definition.
Shaping cultural norms, supra note 1
.
5 Lothar Gundling, Environment, International Protection, in 9 Encyclopedia of Public
International Law 122 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1982) . This may be said about the law
generally, which in the final analysis reflects predominant socio-political values. See supra,
note 1
° See Friedman, Leon (ed), The Laws of War: A Documentary History, 2 vol., Random
House, New York (1972) Best, Geoffrey, War and Law Since 1945, Oxford University
Press, New York (1994).
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Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, 1 (2nd ed. 1989)
(hereinafter Documents).
8 U.N. Charter art 2(4). Article 51 (self-defence) and Chapter VII (Security Council
enforcement actions) provide the only exceptions to this rule. See generally, Romana
Sadurska, Threats ofForce, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 239 (1988). Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense
and The Rule o/Law,S3 Am. J. Int'l L. 259 (1989). Oscar Schachter, The Right of States
to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1620 (1984).
UN. Charter art. 2(3) imposes an obligation on states to settle their disputes by
peaceful means Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, establishes a framework for
states and the United Nations to implement this obligation.
See generally, Bernhart Graefrath, Introduction to the Law of Conflictual Relations,
in International Law: Achievements and Prospects, 710, 711-714, (Mohammed Bedjaoui,
ed.,) UNESCO (1991) (hereinafter Achievements and Prospects). Franck, Who Killed
Article 2(4)7 or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 Am. J Int'l
L. 809,811 (1970).
E.g., Geoffrey Best, The historical evolution ofcultural norms relating to war and the
environment, in Cultural Norms, War and the Environment, 18, 20 (Arthur H. Westing
ed.) ( 1 988)(hereinafter Historical evolution).
1
2
In the case of nuclear exchange the futility of considering protection of the
environment is axiomatic Nuclear capable states have been unwilling to extend
conventional norms to outlaw use of these weapons. For example, the 1977 Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (hereinafter Protocol I), the most recent
update to the laws of war, which the United States has not ratified, was signed subject to
explicit understandings that the Protocol rules were "not intended to have any effect on
and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons." Understandings of United
States and United Kingdom declared upon signature, reprinted in Documents, supra note
7, at 468, Protocol I, at 387. See also, George H. Aldrich, Prospects for United States
Ratification ofAdditional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 Am. J. Int'l. L.
1, 14 (1991). While existing conventions may not include nuclear weapons within their
scope, customary law principles may furnish reasonable grounds for restraining the first
use of these weapons. See infra, Part III, 1 . The question of the legality of nuclear
weapons is pending before the International Court of Justice, which on September 6,
1993 was asked for an advisory opinion by the World Health Organization "in view of the
health and environmental effects" such weapons would have.
1
3




As noted by Westing, the dangers presented by warfare's impact on the environment
are perhaps greater than at any other time in history. The advanced state of
industrialization and development of most countries has radically changed the human
environment. The modern environment is characterized by so-called "dangerous forces",
(e.g. nuclear power plants, chemical factories, and dams, to name a few). These facilities
contain hazards which if unleashed during armed conflict would cause "indirect damage to
the human environment- often of huge proportions..." Arthur H. Westing, Environmental
Hazards of War in an Industrializing World, in Environmental Hazards of War 1,4
(Arthur H. Westing ed ) (1990). (hereinafter Environmental Hazards). See generally,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Warfare in a Fragile World: Military
Impact on the Human Environment 15 (1980) (table 1.2: Ecologically disruptive wars: a
selection). Susan D. Lanier-Graham, The Ecology of War: Environmental Impacts of
Weaponry and Warfare (1993) (historical survey of how armies have incidentally or
intentionally destroyed the natural environment).
Jozef Goldblat, The Mitigation of Environmental Disruption by War: Legal
Approaches, in Environmental Hazards, supra note 14, 48. (hereinafter Legal
Approaches).
'° See Historical evolution, supra note 11. See also, Documents, supra note 7. p2-4
(discussing the development of the sources of the laws of war). See generally, Gerhard
von Glahn, Law Among Nations, MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc. (4th ed., 1981) and
Legal Approaches, supra note 15, (for overview of development of laws of war) The
international law of war was first enunciated in the classical work of Hugo Grotius, On




Shilpi Gupta, Iraq's Environmental Warfare in the Persian Gulf, VI Geo. Int'l Envtl.
L. Rev, 251, 259 (1993).
19
E.g., Stephanie N. Simonds, Conventional warfare and Environmental Protection: A
proposalfor International Legal Reform, 29 Stan. J. Intl L. 165 (1992) (hereinafter Legal
Reform).
20 Susan Emmenegger and Axel Tschentscher, Taking Natures Rights Seriously: The
Long Way to Biocentrism in Environmental Law, VI Geo. Int'l Envtl L. Rev , 545, 547
(1994). (hereinafter Nature 's Rights) The authors review international environmental
instruments (e.g. treaties as well as non-binding instruments such as declarations and
proclamations) and deduce a developmental trend consisting of three different stages.
First, instruments reflective of a "purely anthropocentric vision (protecting nature for the
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good of presently living humans), to encompassing the interests of future generations and
finally to acknowledging an intrinsic value of nature." In the latter case, there are two
schools of thought with significance to the future development of environmental
protection norms in the law of armed conflict; one that views nature as instrumentally
valuable because of its usefulness to humans, and the second which regards nature as
inherently valuable apart from human interest. See generally, Michael J. dennon, Has
International Law Failed the Elephant?, 84 Am. J. Int'I L. 1,7 (1990). Christopher D.
Stone, Should Trees Haw Standing? Toward Legal Rights For Natural Objects, 45
S.Cal. L. Rev. 450, 456 (1972). Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?
Revised: How Far Will Law and Morals Reach? 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1985). (suggesting
conferral of legal rights to the natural environment). The first school of thought is the
dominant ideology reflected in existing law of war. Hence, it has been posited that
although general peacetime instruments, particularly binding conventions, may establish
norms of environmental protection, these norms unless explicitly made applicable in
wartime are part of the "lex generalis". The law of war as "lex specia/is" takes
precedence over inconsistent provisions of the "lex generalis" and therefore its norms
provide the existing parameters for protection of the environment. L C. Green, The
Environment and the Law of Conventional Warfare, in 29 The Canadian Yearbook of
International Law 222, 226 (1992)
21
I refer here to the widely reported actions of the Iraqi military in Kuwait concerning
the release of millions of barrels of crude oil into the Persian Gulf and setting fire to over
700 oil well-heads. The environmental impact of these actions on the natural and human
environment drew worldwide condemnation By most accounts, these tactics violated the
laws of war and political "accountability" was manifested in Security Council Resolution
687. Though not necessarily supportive of a biocentric perspective and not explicitly
based on violation of the jus in hello per se, the Resolution censured Iraq for these
actions, reaffirming that Iraq "is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage,
including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources
,
or injury to
foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion
and occupation of Kuwait " (the last clause may suggest that liability is grounded on
violation of the Charter jus ad hello provisions). U.N. Doc. S/Res 687 (1991) 8 April
1991 (emphasis added). See supra, text accompanying notes 8-10. The environmental
damage caused by Iraq's actions and its present and future impact are thoroughly
documented in
,
The Gulf War Aftermath: An Environmental Tragedy, Muhammad Sadiq
and John C. McCain (eds ) (1993). Additionally, while we will focus primarily on Iraq's
conduct causing environmental damage, the propriety of the Coalition's airstrikes of Iraqi
civil and industrial infrastructure which caused environmental "collateral damage", has
also been the subject of debate. There are those that maintain that damage of this nature is
not appropriately characterized as an "environmental" question. This debate highlights the
problematic threshold issue of defining what is the "environment". Professor Plant, a
vocal proponent of the biocentric approach succinctly summarizes the conceptual
difficulties as follows:
...Notwithstanding the difficulties involved in separating the "environment" from the
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civilian population which lives in its environment and Adam Robert's conviction that
this issue should be discussed as part of the environmental question, the environment
has been and must, in my opinion, be treated as a separate matter from civilian objects,
if only because much of it cannot be an "object" in the sense of ownership or subject-
ion to national jurisdiction.
G. Plant, Environmental Damage and The Laws of War: Points Addressed to Military
Lawyers, in Effecting Compliance, 159 ,161-162 (Hazel Fox and Michael A. Meyer eds.
1993). Citing Adam Robert, Failures in Protecting the Environment in the 1991 Gulf
War, in The Gulf War and International Law, (text under the heading "Coalition Military
Actions") (Peter Rowe ed ) (Routledge, London-forthcoming). See also supra, note 3
discussing the threshold problem of defining the "environment".
22 The environmental devastation unleashed by Iraq had varying consequences on the
environments of regional states as well as global ramifications. Security Council
Resolution 687 affirmed Iraq's general liability in this respect, assuming a causal
connection may be established between Iraq's actions and the injury claimed. See supra,
note 21 Detailed analysis of this aspect of the subject is beyond our present scope,
although we shall later discussed existing and emerging environmental norms that are
relevant to this issue generally. See Infra Part IV, 2 (discussion on extension of liability
for wartime environmental damage under international precedents holding one state liable
for acts which have injurious effects upon third states, and also for damage caused by
transboundary pollution which is a foreseeable consequence of modern warfare activities.
Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Alb.) 1948 I.C.J. 4 Trial Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can) 3
Int'l Arb. Awards 1095 (1938)) See generally, Richard L. Weiner, Limited Armed Conflict
Causing Physical Damage to Neutral Countries: Questions of Liability., 15 Calf. W Int'l
L. Rev. 161 (1985)
"Custom is the oldest and original source of international law." 1 Oppenheim's
International Law 25 (9th ed., 1992), See generally, Henry J. Steiner et. al., Transnational
Legal Problems ( 4th ed., 1994). The customary law of armed conflict was the primary
source of legal regulation until its codification commenced in the second half of the
nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the customary rules continue to have great importance
and vitality as binding rules of conduct and legal decision. Article 38(1 )(b) of the Statute
of the I.C.J, provides that the Court shall apply "international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law." Thus, in the event a belligerent is not a party to an
applicable treaty, the legality of its conduct is judged by prevailing customary law norms;
which may, nonetheless be the applicable treaty norms if they have attain customary law
status. E.g. Walter G Sharp, Sr., The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage
During Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, 137 Mil. L. R 1,6
(1992) (hereinafter Effective Deterrence), citing North Sea Continental Shelf Case
(F.R.G. v. Den.) (F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 4., and article 38 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties ("Nothing ... precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming
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binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such").
The obligatory nature of customary law is again highlighted in article 43 of the same
Convention which provides, in part, that a party who denounces or withdrawals from an
applicable treaty is nevertheless under a duty "to fulfil any obligation embodied in the
treaty to which it would be subject under international law independently of the treaty."
Furthermore, Article 60(5) is especially significant in the context of warfare as it states
that treaties of a humanitarian character continue in force in the event of a "material
breach" by another party. U.N Document A/Conf. 39/27, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 331. (hereinafter
Vienna Convention LOT). The I C.J. has specifically ruled that codification of customary
rules does not displace the applicability of customary law which is per se binding on all
states Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), I.C.J. Rep 392 (1984), I.C.J. Rep 14 (1986). See, e.g., Documents, supra note
7, at 4-5. See also, Legal Problems, supra note 1, at 303-306. (discussing the
interrelationship between conventional law and development of customary law norms).
Richard Falk, The Environmental Law of War: an Introduction, in Environmental
Protection supra note 3, at 78, 85. (hereinafter Environmental Law).
25
Id. at 84.
Documents, supra note 7, at 4.
Besty Baker, Legal Protectionsfor the Environment in Times ofArmed Conflict,33
Va. J. Int'l L. 351, 360 (1993). (hereinafter Legal Protections).
28 See supra, note 2 1
.
29 Legal Protections, supra note 27 at 360 Professor Falk analysis of the interplay of
these principles is as follows: "In practice, military necessity has been subjectively defined
in wartime, and has prevailed over inconsistent norms of customary international law
associated with the legal duty to restrict methods and means of combat by reference to the
capacity to distinguish military and non-military targets ('Principle of Discrimination'), to
confine military responses to an orbit of proportionality ('Principle of Proportionality'), and
to avoid tactics that inflict superfluous and severe suffering ('Principle of Humanity').
Submarine warfare, aerial bombardment, and atomic/nuclear weaponry illustrate the
breach of these customary constraints by subjective invocations of 'military necessity'."
Environmental Law, supra note 24, at 80. For discussions of military necessity see,
Michael Bothe et al., New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts, Commentary on the
Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, at 196-97, art.
35.2.3.3. (1982), Bernard K. Schafer, The Relationship Between the International Laws
ofArmed Conflict and Environmental Protection: The Need to Reevaluate What Types of
Conduct are Permissible During Hostilities, 1 9 Cal W Int'l L J. 287, 288 ( 1 989).
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For example, international economic law has to deal with definitional problems as well.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade uses terms such as "like product", "like
domestic products" and "treatment no less favorable" that are in context equally
ambiguous and which are applied and interpreted according to commercial expectations
emanating from state practice. See John H. Jackson et. al., Legal Problems of
International Economic Relations, 444, 501-503, 521-530. See also supra, notes 3 and
21, discussing general difficulties with defining the concept of "environment" in
international law.
31
Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, International Law and Armed Conflict, 342,
(Dartmouth) (1992) (hereinafter, International Law and Armed Conflict).
See supra note 1
.
33 Lucien J Dhooge, At The Crossroads: The United Nations andArmed Intervention in
the 1990's. at 44 (1995) (LL M. unpublished thesis, on file with author).
34
International Law and Armed Conflict, supra note 31, at 342. See also, Documents,
supra note 7, at 5-6
35
Dieter Fleck, Legal and Policy Perspectives, in Effecting Compliance 143, 144 (Hazel
Fox and Michael A. Meyer eds , 1993). (hereinafter Policy Perspectives)
"}/£
Legal Protections, supra note 27, at 360
37 id
38 Environmental Law, supra note 24, at 85 See also, supra note 23, discussion on the




See, e.g., Effective Deterrence, supra note 23, at 28-30.
41 William A. Wilcox, Jr., Environmental protection In Combat, 17 S. HI. U. L. J. 299.
303 (1993). See Part III, 2(B)(b) infra, text accompanying notes 90-94, for discussion
regarding application of concept of "unnecessary suffering" to environmental damage.
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Policy Perspectives, supra note 35 at 145. Citing Hannikaine, Peremptory Norms
(Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status, 713
(1988).
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
Annex Thereto Embodying Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat 2277, T.S. No. 539. (hereinafter Hague Convention IV and
Hague Regulations) reprinted in, Documents, supra note 7, at 4,44. Hague Convention
IV made slight revisions to the earlier Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and
Customs ofWar on Land, July 26, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403, and the Regulations
annexed thereto (Hereinafter Hague Convention II). Hague Convention IV, article 4,
states that it replaced Hague Convention II as between parties to both conventions
Hague Convention II, however, continues in effect as to 18 states which have not ratified
Hague Convention IV. Although, these non-parties are also bound by Hague Convention
IV provisions which are now generally considered customary law. See supra, note 23,
and infra note 75 and accompanying text In most respects the conventions are identical
See infra, Part III, 2(B) for discussion of Hague Convention IV provisions relevant to
environmental protection.
Documents, supra note 7, 45.
45
Id, at 4.
46 G. Plant, Introduction to Environmental Protection, supra note 3, at 17. See also,
Legal Reform, supra note 19 at 192. (discussing Martens Clause as basis for authoritative
incorporation of environmental norms into customary law of armed conflict). Legal
Protections, supra note 27, at 351-352 (asserting that international law limits
environmental damage not only because it harms humans," but also because the "dictates
of public conscience" and principles of law increasingly recognize that the environment
should be protected in its own right. " Citing Protocol I conference debates, notes some
delegates viewed wartime environmental protection as "an end in itself. Other delegates
viewed protection as means to secure "the continued survival of the civilian population."
1 5 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development
of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts 358 (1978).
A *7
See supra note 1
.
4° See infra Part IV, Environmental Law Norms.
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Glen Plant, Elements of a 'Fifth Geneva' Convention on the Protection of the





See supra note 46.
52
Nature's Rights, supra note 20, at 568-572 (explaining the emerging non-
anthropocentric paradigm and nature's own rights).
51
See Nature's Rights, supra note20, at 547-548. The author's explain the basis of the
paradigm shift theory as follows:
The conception of humankind's relation to nature depends upon whatever theory
we have with regard to the natural order and our place in it See John Rawls,
A Theory of Justice (1971) This theory then becomes our environmental
paradigm when we think about nature A paradigm shift, therefore, includes
a reevaluation of our relationship with the rest of nature.
The theory of paradigm shifts as a sequence of events leading to major changes
(revolutions) in scientific knowledge dates back to the work of Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn
uses paradigms as a framework to describe and analyze world views and their effects
on people's conceptualization and information processing Thomas S. Kuhn, The
Structure of Science Revolutions 1 1 1-35 (2d ed. 1970). Our environmental paradigm
include how we see our relationship to nature, if and how we control nature, and
whether we limit our actions because of nature Paradigm shifts as opposed to other
shifts of perspective are multidimensional, i.e., affect different areas of society,
knowledge, and value at the same time. See Richard Routley, Roles and Limits of
Paradigms in Environmental Thought and Action, in Environmental Philosophy
260-293, 271, 275, 278 (Robert Elliot & Arran Gere eds 1983). In other words,
to realize the peace with nature, changes are necessary in all areas of thought
Klauss Michael Meyer-Abich, Wege Zum Frieden Mit Der Natur. Praktische
Naturphilosophie Fur Die Umweltpolitik, 1 1 (Munchen 1986).
See also, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
54 id
55 See supra, text accompanying notes 27-30. See infra, note 198 (discussing policy
strategies of states in international law).
57

See Environmental Law, supra note 23, at 81 . Professor Falk describes one dimension
of this norm-building process and the descriptive problem thus raised as follows: (T) he
strengthening and developing of international law often occurs in the aftermath of a
prominent war in which the victorious side was the victim of belligerent practices that fell
outside its views of the canons of military necessity and exceeded permissible limits upon
methods and means of warfare Because the impact of such practices is exerted both upon
the interpretative process pertaining to existing law and upon the reformative process that
generates new law, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the reinterpreted from the
innovative when describing the content of the law of war. Id. See generally, Grigory
Tunkin, A New Political Thinking and International Law, in International Law In
Transition (R.S. Pathak and R.P. Dhokalia eds. 1992) (" A new thinking ... means that we
all have to change our approach to many problems of society to make it adequate to the
new realities.. . The new political thinking is trying,. .
., to find ways of resolving these
problems...They include in particular, the notion of the inter-State system, its
components, what changes are taking place and should take place in their relationships,
etc.") Id. at 177-178.
R.H.F. Austin, The Law of International Armed Conflict, in Achievements and
Prospects, supra note 10, 783, 766 See also, supra note 1 and accompanying text,
(discussion relative to international law-making process).
58 Environmental Law, supra note 24, at 86. See infra, Part IV Environmental Law
Norms, discussion regarding development of environmental law as a distinct subject of
international concern
^9 Ronald St. John MacDonald, The Use of Force by States in International Inw, in
Achievements and Prospects, supra note 10, at 717.
60
International Law and Armed Conflict, supra note 3 1, at 209.
61 Supra, note 43. See also, Part III, 2 (survey of conventional law).
62
International Law and Armed Conflict, supra note 31, at 217. But see, Chris Af
Jochnick and Roger Normand, Ihe Legitimization of Violence: A Critical History of the
Laws of War, 35 Harv. Int'l L.J. 49 (1994); and, Roger Normand and Chris Af Jochnick,
The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 35 Harv. Int'l L.J. 387
(1994) (challenging the "widespread belief of the humanitarian nature of the laws of war.
The authors concluded in their first article, that the laws of war institutionalize violence at
the expense of humanitarian values. Specifically, they attempt to illustrate, that the
"Hague Conferences, which crowned the legal codifications of the nineteenth century and
were generally hailed as humanitarian milestones for subjecting war to the discipline of
law, in fact enshrined the priority of military over humanitarian considerations." From
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their perspective, the "powerful nations deliberately formulated the laws of war to advance
the primacy of military violence over humanitarian concerns, despite noble rhetoric to the
contrary." Id. Compare with, Effective Deterrence, supra note 23, at 30 (stating that the
laws of war "are not subject to, or restricted by, the principle of military necessity
....(instead military necessity) is subject to, and restricted by, the laws of armed conflict")
See also, supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
Plant, supra note 21, at 163. See also supra, Legal Reform note 19, at 170. The
reader should also bear in mind these variable zones of conflict in the application of
customary law norms, principally in zones other than those which belong to the belligerent
whose conduct is questionable. This qualification is necessary because conventional law
allows belligerents almost complete latitude for military activities within their own
territories. State sovereign rights, that time honored core principal of the international
legal framework, is most evidently controlling and defining the limits of constraining
norms. Perhaps we are to infer that the vigorous hold of self-interest will motivate states
toward moderate conduct in the heat of battle when deciding to destroy their own
property and resources, including their natural environment. Regrettably, the annuals of
war are filled with accounts of states sacrificing dearly, their property, environment, and
even their citizens, for the sake of what they defined as militarily necessary. From this
perspective, the imperative was essentially either do the devastating act and "justify" the
losses, or lose the war. The historical record convincingly demonstrates that for the most
part self-preservation and the existing status quo have higher precedence in the states'
hierarchy of relative values See also, Part V infra. See generally, Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 386
(concerning obligations for the peaceful exploration and use of outer space).
See supra, note 56 and accompanying text.
65 Legal Approaches, supra note 15, at 48. See generally, e.g., Protection of the
Environment in Times of Armed Conflict. Report of the Secretary-General. U.N. Doc.
A/47/328 (provides general overview of existing law provisions relating to environmental
protection).
66 The limited scope of the present undertaking necessitates narrowing the present survey
to consideration of land-based armed conflict rules which are relevant to protection of the
environment. Most wars are fought on land and their potential devastation presents the
greatest threat to human beings and the natural environment. Thus, land-based conflicts
offer ripe opportunities to assess alternatives for development of the law of armed conflict
to further contemporary values relative to environmental protection. Additionally,
environmental aspects of land-based warfare, also permits consideration of general
principles of the law of armed conflict, which are pertinent to potential environmental
damage in other battlefield zones. In any event, the general premises underlying the
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author's thesis also have applicability to zones of conflict other than land. The author
posits that existing law of armed conflict and the general international law regime,
including the legal framework of the U.N. Charter, provides a flexible legal regime which
accommodates evolving values.
For example, consider Iraq's pollution of the Persian Gulf from the perspective of
customary law and relevant conventional norms. Based on our analysis of customary law
norms we may deduce that the high seas environment, as well as the environment of
Kuwait's "occupied" sea, is protected from wanton, unnecessary damage during armed
conflict. See supra Part III, 1. We next question whether the oil dumping was
proportional to the military objective sought to be achieved. Another way of asking the
question is whether the military benefits expected to be achieved, are outweighed by the
foreseeable adverse consequences. The international reaction and demand for
accountability, as well as a reasonable assessments of the costs and benefits involved,
bears out overwhelmingly that the oil discharge can not be justified by any calculation of
military necessity. It would be, in my opinion, an unreasonable stretching of this
admittedly elastic concept when considered in the overall context of Iraq's military
situation. Essentially, Iraq unleashed a "weapon" over which it could not exercise
effective control and which had a very low probability to "weaken the enemy". St.
Petersburg Declaration of 1868, infra note 67 and accompanying text. Having no control
over the Gulfs currents and winds, the foreseeable disproportionate environmental harm
per se, as well as the severe health and economic consequences on non-belligerents and
neutrals, would appear to dictate that Iraq not resort to indiscriminate oil dumping.
Consequently, Iraq violated the customary principles of discrimination, proportionality and
humanity. The limitation principle, which is binding on Iraq, dictates that right to inflict
damage is not unlimited. Also, the legitimacy of these acts under existing and emerging
environmental law norm, is questionable. See Part IV infra. Environmental Law Norms.
E.g., Gupta supra note 18, at 254-266.
Moreover, and in support of my thesis that existing law provides a normative basis for
environmental protection, it is pertinent to highlight that had the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea (LOS) been in force during the war, it entered into force in November
1994, it would have provided a legal theory for holding Iraq responsible for
environmental damage to the marine environment, even assuming arguendo that Iraq had
a viable military necessity defense. Under article 192 of the LOS convention, arguably a
"lex specialist (see supra, note 20) on equal footing of obligation with the laws of war,
Iraq as a party to the convention would have a general obligation "to protect and preserve
the marine environment." (the author perceives a potential conflicts of law issue, if we
were dealing with two lex specialis conventional norms- in this instance that is not the
case. Here, the treaty norm entails a more pressing binding obligation breach of which
gives rise to state responsibility over special customary norms, which are not generally
viewed as jus cogens). See supra, note 23, Vienna Convention LOT (article 26 {pacta
sunt servanda), article 53 (treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general
international law) and article 64 (emergence of a new peremptory norm of general
international law). Also, article 194 imposes a duty to "take... all measures... that are
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necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any
source,...." Moreover, article 235 affirms the responsibility of states "for the fulfillment
of their international obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine
environment But, the article reflects one institutional weakest inherent in the international
legal framework, which again we will take up in Part V infra, and which makes adoption
of biocentric conventional norms applicable during armed conflict a fantastic endeavor, by
expressing that states "shall be liable in accordance with international law." And, of
course, "States shall co-operate in the implementation of existing international law and the
further development of international law relating to responsibility and liability for the
assessment of and compensation for damage..." United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1293 (1982). The Kuwait Regional Convention for the
Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution (Kuwait
Convention), to which Iraq is a party, has analogous provisions which proscribe the
pollution of the Gulf, however it also has a weak regime for ensuring compliance
essentially identical to article 235 of the LOS convention. E.g., Gupta, supra note 18, at
263-264. Kuwait Convention, Apr 28, 1978, reprinted in Selected Multilateral Treaties
in the Field of the Environment 486 (A. Kiss ed., 1983).
fin
1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight reprinted in, Documents, supra note 7, at 30.
(hereinafter St Petersburg Declaration) The author arbitrarily commences this survey
with this widely lauded international instrument as it has a more tangible connection to the
subject of environmental protection during armed conflict. The Declaration was the
precursor to the "Hague law" branch of the law of armed conflict, which addresses the
rights and duties of belligerents during armed conflict and limits the means and methods of
injuring the enemy However, it should be noted that there were several relevant
codification conventions prior to the St. Petersburg Declaration. For instance, The
Declaration of Paris of 1856, considered the "first law-of-war multilateral treaty", dealt
with rules of maritime blockade during war to promote certainty in economic relations
between belligerents and neutral states, and thus elaborated the Law of Neutrality. See
generally, Weiner, supra note 22 and Best, infra note 69. Also, a most important, as well
as lasting, development occurred in 1864 with the adoption of the first Geneva
Convention, thus marking the beginning of the "Geneva tradition" branch of humanitarian
law. Geneva Convention, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, reprinted in Friedman, The Law of War: A
Documentary History (1972). The 1864 convention, as are the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, was underscored by humanitarian concerns for the prevention and
mitigation of unnecessary suffering and death of victims of war. Austin, supra note 57, at
776-777. See, Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No 3362; Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75U.N.TS. 287
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/TO00 Documents, supra note 7, at 29. See also, supra text accompanying notes 25-27
Geoggrey Best, War and Law Since 1945, 42 (1994). See also, supra text
accompanying note 44.(The Preamble to the Hague Convention IV which also reflects this
general draftsmanship approach.)
70
Documents, supra note 7. at 30-31.
71 Anthony Leibler, Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage: NeM' Challenges For
International Law, 23 California Western International Law Journal 67, 100-101 (1992).
72 Documents, supra note 7, at 30. Conventional limitations on the use of certain
weapons has a direct protective effect on the environment by limiting the means available
to belligerents for prosecution of military objectives. For example, the use of land mines
and incendiary weapons is restricted by Protocols to the 1981 Inhumane Weapons
Convention and the first use of chemical and biological weapons is proscribed by the 1925
Poisonous Weapons Protocol United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions
of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. UN Doc A/Conf. 95/15 (1980), reprinted in
19 I.L.M. 1523-36, supra note 7, at 473. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,
June 17, 1925, 94 L.N T.S 655, reprinted in, supra Documents note 7, at 139.
73
See supra, note 43 (background discussion on Hague Conventions II (1899) and IV
(1907). We will focus on Hague Convention IV, relating to land warfare, and more
specifically on its Regulations relevant to environmental protection. The Second Hague
Peace Conference of 1907 adopted thirteen conventions and one declaration, but not all
their work related directly to development of the laws of war, and one convention did not
enter into force. Nonetheless, the contracting states refined Hague law and further
developed conventional law of war. Other contemporaneous conventions with
significance to development of the laws of war and tangentially related to the subject
under discussion, but beyond our present scope, include: Hague Convention No. Ill
Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; Hague
Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of
War on Land, Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540. Reprinted in, Documents supra
note 7, at 63. Hague Convention IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time
of War, Id. at 94. Hague Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers in Naval War. Id., at 110.
Austin, supra note 57, at 778. This is not to imply that there was no groundwork laid
for these international initiative and achievements. Actually, the Lieber Code of 1863,
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authored primarily by Francis Lieber, is regarded as the first modern codification of laws
of armed conflict. Drafted at the behest of President Lincoln, it was implemented under
General Orders, No. 100, "Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field", by the
Union Army during the American Civil War. The Lieber Code elaborated generally
established rules of war, inter alia, the treatment of civilians and prisoners of war. The
Code was extremely influential and was improvised in other national codes and in the
Hague Regulations. See generally, supra Green, note 20, at 223, and, The Theory and
Conduct of War, 29 Encyclopedia Britannica Macropoedia 642.
75
E.g., James P. Terry, The Environment and the Laws of War: The Impact of Desert
Storm, XLV Naval War C. Rev. 61, 62. The Regulations were applied and considered
"declaratory of the laws and customs of war" applicable to all states by the International
Tribunal at Nuremberg. Id., citing International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg),
"Judgment and Sentence", 41 Am. J. Int'l L. 172 (1947). See generally, Anthony
D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law 1 13-121 (1971). See supra, text
to note 23, Vienna Convention LOT (article 43). Essentially, the Regulations customary
law status effectively renders nugatory article 2 of the Convention, the reciprocal
application clause, which stated that the Regulations were only binding as between
Contracting Powers, and article 8, its denunciation provision. Documents, supra note 7,
at 46-47 In the case of Iraq, the Regulations are binding as customary law since Iraq is
not a party to Hague Convention IV. When the convention was signed on October 18,
1907, Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire a non-party to the convention. From 1919
until 1932, Iraq a mandate territory of the United Kingdom, but England "apparently never
acceded" to the convention on Iraq's behalf E.g. supra, Sharp, note 23, at 8-9.
See supra, text accompanying note 58
77 Harry H Almond, Jr., Protecting The Environment, 23 U. Tol. L. Rev. 295, 337
(1992).
78
E.g., The 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare; The 1936 London Proces-Verbal
Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London,
22 Apr. 1930, The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; The four 1949 Geneva Conventions; The 1954
Hague Convention and the 1954 Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict. See generally Documents, supra note 7.
79
E.g., Simmons, supra note 19 at 107-171. Other provisions, not discussed in detail
herein, which provide a basis for a duty not to damage the environment in the specified
circumstances, have been similiarly critiqued. These include: Article 25: The attack or
bombardments, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are
undefended is prohibited Articles 28 and 47, respectively: The pillage of a town or place,
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even when taken by assault, is prohibited, (and) Pillage is formally forbidden. Articles 46
and 56, respectively; Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as
well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected Private property can not be
confiscated, (and) The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion,
charity and education, the arts and sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as
private property. All seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions of this
character, historical monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden, and should be
made the subject of legal proceedings. Id. See generally supra, Documents note 7, at 53,
56-57. (text of articles). Davis P. Goodman, The Needfor Fundamental Change in the
Law ofBelligerent Occupation, 37 Stan. L Rev. 1573 (1985)
on
See supra, Sharp, note 23 at 9-12, 32. It is posited that this interpretative process
supports my thesis that the existing legal regime is adaptable to changing social attitudes
which mature into authoritative norms Here, it is pertinent to recall that states
acknowledged this was not a "complete code of the laws of war" and that traditional
modalities of norm-making in inter-state relations (i.e. customary law) continued to be a
significant source constraint on belligerent conduct. Clearly it was understood that the
laws of war would continue to develop. Accordingly, the general prohibitions in the
Regulations were eventually subject to evolving interpretations to cover "cases" (e.g.
values) arising from belligerent's progressive capabilities to engage in conduct contrary to
"the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public
conscience" See supra, Part III, 1(B) (discussion on applicability of customary law to
environmental protection and the significance of the Martens Clause in the law-making
process, including the infusion of environmental norms into the laws of war)
81 Hague Convention IV, Section II- Hostilities, Chapter I. Supra, Documents note 7,
at 52. Article 22, the first article in this chapter, provides" The right of belligerents to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." See supra, text accompanying notes
26-29,36-37,40-42 (discussing significance of limitation principle as constraining
belligerent conduct and applicability to environmental damage) (Almond notes that this
general principle is, "in large measure, an adaptation of the principle of military
necessity,...." Almond, supra note 77 at 337.)
82 id
See supra note 3 (discussion regarding alternative ways of defining the "environment"
and the threshold issue this difficulty presents to the future development of the law of
armed conflict.)
Hague Declaration 2 Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, 1 899, reprinted in Documents,
supra note 7 at 36.
64

8 Goldblat, supra note 15 at 49-50. This Protocol, which has been ratified by over 100
nations, is considered by Goldblat to be lacking in the following manner: 1) its non-use
obligation is limited to "war" vice "armed conflict" the latter being a more inclusive
contemporary term, 2) it has a reciprocal obligation clause making it binding only "as
between" state parties. The protocol has been subject to reservations limiting obligations
thereunder to prohibit "first use", allowing for retaliatory use; and, more fundamentally,
there is relative uncertainty as to what substances are properly within the protocol's scope.
Moreover, the banning of biological and toxin weapons was also the subject of the 1972
Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Id. Granted, while far from
comprehensive, and putting the difficult problems of interpretation aside, this protocol to
the extent it constraints belligerent conduct and promotes humanitarian values , also
indirectly benefits and protect the environment.
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925), reprinted in, Documents supra
note 7 at 139, 137.
87
See supra, Part III, 1 text accompanying notes 25-29, 37, 40-42.
88 Sharp, supra note 23, at 10
89 id
90
Leibler, supra note 71, at 100.
91
Id., citing 1907 Hague Convention IV, art. 23(e), Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1 164 (17th ed. 1976).
9?
See supra note 21. Although Iraq is not a party to the Hague Convention IV, its
damage to the environment nonetheless come within its normative constraints as it
essentially codifies customary law. However, in a technical sense the convention is not
available as the legal basis to allege a breach of international obligations.
93
Discussed, infra, Part III, 2(2)(c)
See supra, note 72. As discussed there, the weapons limitations embodied in the
Protocols to this Convention have an indirect environmental protective affect. The ICRC
summarized its role in environmental protection as follows" This Convention was
concluded under the United Nations auspices and is intended, as its name implies, to
prohibit or restrict the use of certain weapons. It has three annexed protocols dealing
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with: (a) non-detectable fragments, (b) mines, booby-traps and other devices, and (c)
incendiary weapons. The second and third of these should make useful contributions to
protecting the environment in times of armed conflict." International Committee of the
Red Cross and Secretary General, Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed
Conflict. Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/47/328 (31 July 92). (hereinafter
ICRC Report)
Leibler, supra note 71, at 100.
See supra note 21 (general discussion on divergent views of legality of Gulf War
environmental impacts).
97
Antonio Cassese, Means of Warfare. The Traditional and the New Law, The New
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 162-163 (1979), cited in Leibler, supra note 71, at
100-101.
98
See supra, text accompanying note 69 (Best notes, in assessing the St Petersburg
Declaration, the historical pattern of qualification and ambiguity of language which marks
the development of the laws of war).
This practice of states in which essentially they hold all the cards and apply the rules
to sanction acts under the banner of military necessity has monumental significance to
legal approaches for environmental protection during armed conflict. Essentially, it
becomes a matter of competing policy choices striking at the very core of the state's
political sovereignty. We explore the implications of this aspect of state behavior in Part
V.
100 See supra, note 21
E.g., Simmons, supra note 19 at 171 (arguing that while under international law
"property" includes land and airspace, it does not include outerspace).
i at
Policy Perspectives, supra note 35, at 144-145. See also, Antoine Bouvier,
Protection of the Natural Environment in time of Armed Conflict, 285 Int'l Rev. Rec
Cross 567, 572 (1991) (Considers Art. 23(g) one of the earliest provisions for protection
of the environment).
1 03
See infra, text accompanying note 109, (discussion regarding obligations of
Occupying Power).
See generally, Annotated Supplement to Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations, pg 5-8. (Naval Warfare Publication, NWP 9.) Extended consideration
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of this subject is beyond our present purpose, but it should be recognized that it is an
integral part of the philosophy underlying the laws of war. For example, as stated above
among the central principles of military economy is the principle of economy of force,
which "means that no more-or less-effort should be devoted to a task than is necessary to
achieve the objective This implies the correct selection and use of weapons and weapons
systems, maximum productivity from available weapons platforms, and careful balance in
the allocation of tasks This principle is embodied in the fundamental legal principle of
proportionality." Id.
105 The Hostage Case (United States v. Wilhelm List et al), 1 1 TWC 1253-54, reprinted
in Id. at 5-4 ~ 5-5. This case involved the practice of "collective punishment" justified as
a "reprisal" measure, in which civilians in varying numbers and places were executed in
response to the killing of German soldiers and acts of sabotage by resistance movements
Collective punishment and hostage taking was not solely a German practice during World
War II, but the German occupation forces carried the practice to new heights Best
describes the general context of the case as follows: "The scale on which hostages had
sometimes been killed and collective punishments inflicted was judged to have been
excessive, intimidating, and terroristic, some would have added, quasi-genocidal The acts
picked out for censure were not reprisals in the proper understanding of the term, they
were retaliations going beyond legal limits of reasonable proportion and just
discrimination, the judges in USA v. List et al condemned them but less forcefully than
they might have done had the relevant law not been so inexplicit and ambiguous." Best,
supra note 6, at 312-313. See also infra, note 116 and accompanying text (defining
reprisal and its role as an effective deterrent against illegal wartime conduct) See
generally, Davis P Goodman, The Need for Fundamental Change in The Law of
Belligerent Occupation, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1573 (1985).
Gupta, supra note 18, at 257. See note 66 for discussion of this issue in the context
of Iraq's pollution of the Persian Gulf.
107 Sharp, supra note 23 at 32.
lKJO
Id. The threshold of permissible damage has been dealt with in two conventions,




Sharp, supra note 23, at 11.
Documents, supra note 7, at 57.




Almond, supra note 77.
in
Cited in, Austin, supra note 57, at 788 note 10.
The Nuremberg Charter and the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg after World War Two must be considered as part of the legal milieu in which
the modern laws of war operate. They are significant because they affirmed customary
law, as well as established, key principles relating to individual war crime liability For
example, article 6(b) of the Charter affirmed the customary law rule that violations of the
laws of war created individual criminal responsibility. Under article 6, liability could be
extended to "leaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices participating in the
formulation or execution of a common plan." Also, Article 8, laid to rest the theory of
"superior orders" as a defense to war crimes. The "Nuremberg Principles" were affirmed
by the U.N. General Assembly on 11 December 1946. G.A. Res. 95(1), 1(2)RG A 188
( 1 946)(affirming "the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal") See generally, e.g., Leibler,
supra note 71, at 114
Sharp, supra note 23, at 12.
Best, supra note 6, at 311, 420-421. Reprisal may be defined as "a measured,
purposeful, unlawful act in response to an unlawful act of the enemy's, illegal though the
reprisal may be, its justification is that nothing less will serve to stop the other in his
lawless track The purpose of reprisals is suppose to be simply deterrent and admonitory
Retortion is the technical term for retaliation for discourteous, or unkind and inequitable








See supra, note 105 and accompanying text
See supra, note 1 and accompanying text.
1 70 Von Glahn, supra note 16, at 604. Extensive consideration of illegal environmental
damage as a basis for individual war crime liability is beyond our present scope. However,
it is part and parcel of the existing enforcement regime which remains largely untapped
See supra, note 1 14 (discussion on Nuremberg principles) See also, infra Part IV(2)(B)
(discussion of Geneva Conventions common articles relative to war crime prosecutions for
"grave breaches") and Part V, Environmental Protection: Future Prosecutes under the
Laws of Armed conflict, (discussion on straightening the existing legal regime). With
respect to state accountability for violations of the Regulations, Article 3 of Hague
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Convention IV, which states the general customary rule of state responsibility for
breaches of international obligations, provides: "A belligerent party which violates the
provisions of the said regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation.
It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces."
Documents, supra note 7, at 46. The author is keenly aware that when speaking of
environmental damage, compensation may be incalculable as elements of the environment
are not amenable to market based principles of valuation and also not susceptible to
replacement costs analysis. Environmental clean-up costs and restoration of the natural
environment are, however, subject to recoupment. Thus, a preventive approach to
averting excessive environmental damage, I believe, is a critical element of a legal regime
for environmental protection in armed conflict For the reasons argued in Part V, the
author believes that the exiting normative framework, while in need of further elaboration
to achieve that goal, provides the best preventive approach, short of an outright
prohibition against harming the environment which under existing socio-political
conditions is unrealistic.
See supra, note 105.
1 11
Documents, supra note 7, at 169.
1 23
Chapter III- The Sick and Wounded- article 21, provides: "The obligations of
belligerents with regard to the sick and wounded are governed by the Geneva
Convention." The applicable convention was the 1906 Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, which
replaced, as between parties to both, the first Geneva Convention of 1864 (see supra,
note 67) Documents, supra note 7, at 52
Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.AS. No 3362, Geneva Convention II for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.AS. No. 3363; Geneva Convention III Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.AS No. 3364, Geneva
Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 6 U ST. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Reprinted in Documents,
supra, note 7, 171-337. Since our inquiry is limited to examination of the existing norms
relating to environmental protection during land-based warfare activities, we will primarily
focus on Convention IV. However, as discussed infra Part III,2(2)(b), there are articles
common to each of the four conventions which establish an enforcement regime with




Documents, supra note 7, at 172, 170. Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (hereinafter Protocol I). Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). reprinted in Documents, supra note 7, at
389 and 449, respectively. Protocol II is not relevant to our study as the traditional jus in
bello does not apply in internal conflicts. However, while it has not provisions
concerning the environment, it provides protections analogous to instruments applicable
in international armed conflict, thus providing incidental protection to the environment
during internal strife. For example, article 14- Protection of objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population- provides: "Starvation of civilians as a method of
combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render
useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,
such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock,
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works." Documents, supra note 7,
at 456. See generally, supra ICRC Report note 94, at 7.
Documents, supra note 7, at 170
1 27
Article 33, addresses the problem presented by the Hostage Case and parallels the
Hague Regulations prohibition on pillage It provides that: No protected person may be
punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and
likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited. Pillage is prohibited.
1 28
See supra text accompanying notes 109-111 (discussion on article 55) and note 79
(for text to article 46).
1 29 Geneva Convention IV, Documents supra, note 7 at 290.
1 30
E.g., Simonds, supra note 19, at 172. Citing the International Committee of the Red
Cross Commentary as follows: (The objective was to)"protect a strictly defined categories
of civilians from arbitrary action on the part of the enemy, and not from the dangers due to
the military operations themselves. Anything tending to provide such protection was
systematically removed from the convention." Commentary on the IV Geneva
Convention, at 10 (Jean S Pictet ed., 1958). See also, supra Leibler, note 71, at 106
(noting article applies only in event of occupation, "if an air-force bombs factories in an
enemy country, such destruction is not covered by Article 53. Only if the enemy power
occupies the territory where the factories are situated will such destruction be prohibited-





Article 28 cautions belligerents not to use non-belligerents as shields: "The presence
of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from
military operations." Documents, supra note 7, at 283.
1 32
See supra, note 120. (discussion of Article 3, Hague Convention IV, imposing
obligation to make compensation for violating the Regulations).
133
Articles 50/51/130/147 provide as follows:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the
grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article.
Each . . . Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and
in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for tirial
to another . . . Party concerned, provided such . . Party has made out a prima facie case
Each . . . Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to
the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined. . . .
Documents, supra, note 7 at 323 (Geneva Convention IV).
Documents, supra note 7, at 323.
i •a c
Protocol I, supra note 125, art 85(3)(b). This provision is subject to two
qualifications: 1) the act must be "willfully" committed and result in "death or serious
injury to body or health. 2) only state parties are bound to treat these acts as "grave
breaches". See generally, Leibler supra note 71, at 114-115.
] 'if.
See supra, text accompanying notes 25 and 70.
137lJ Common articles 51/52/131/148 provide: No . . . Party shall be allowed to absolve
itself or any other . . . Party of any liability incurred by itself or by another . . Party in
respect of breaches referred to in the preceding Article. Documents, supra note 7, at 324.
138JO Protocol I was negotiated in the early 1970's, soon after the Stockholm Conference
of 1972, the widely recognized catalyst for the emergence of environmental law as a
distinct branch of international law. Discussed infra, Part IV, Environmental Law Norms
The Protocol, however, has not been universally adopted. The United States has signed
but not ratified the agreement primarily because of "political" objections to Article 1(4), a
provision purportedly according the protections of the Protocol to "terrorists" groups
involved in national liberation movements Thus, while many of its general provision are
reflective of customary law, generally flowing form their Geneva law roots, some,
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including the environmental law provisions discussed below are not considered as binding
customary law, and apply only as between Parties to the Protocol E.g., see generally,
Aldrich, supra note 12.
1 "JQ
Simonds, supra note 19, at 172.
Richard Carruthers, International Controls on the Impact on the Environment of
Wartime Operations, in Environmental and Planning Law Journal (Feb 1993) 38, 41. See
generally, supra Part III. There are two provisions which provide expansive protection to
the environment: 1) article 55(2) provides: "Attacks against the natural environment by
way of reprisals are prohibited." 2) article 56 -protection of works and installations
containing dangerous forces- provides in part: "1. Works or installations containing
dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not
be made the object ofattack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such
attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the
civilian population Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or
installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of
dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the
civilian population."
Paragraph two sets forth specific exceptions which "leave minimal scope for divergent
interpretation". Liebler, supra note 71, at 108. The protected areas enjoy qualified
immunity, which ceases to apply when the named works and installations are "used for
other than its normal function and in regular, significant and direct support of military
operations" and attacking it is the "only feasible way to terminate such support " Other
provisions remind the parties to the protocol that "(i)n all cases, the civilian population
and individual civilians shall remain entitled to all the protection accorded them by
international law, including the protection of the precautionary measures" necessary to
"spare" civilians from the adverse impacts of military operations, and that reprisals against
the protected areas are prohibited (See, article 57- precautions in attack). Documents,
supra note 7, at 418-419 (emphasis added: these provisions of the protocol are not
considered reflective of customary law) Leibler, supra.
Aldrich, supra note 12, at 14.
Documents, supra note 7, at 409.
Id, at 418.143
ENMOD has been characterized as a "disarmament treaty" which deals with use of
the environment as a weapon in war. Carruthers, supra note 140, at 46. It is binding on
55 states, including those countries, such as the United States, Soviet Union successor
states, England, Japan, Germany with the technological base necessary to potentially carry
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out the acts proscribed by the convention. Liebler supra note 71, at 81. While we will
not discuss all its aspects in detail, its role in international law and its similarity of terms
with Protocol I are worthy of note to appreciate the disparity in opinions regarding
permissible quantum of environmental damage in warfare. The following articles of the
Convention are relevant background for purposes of the comparison with Protocol I
which follows: Article I.
1
.
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other
hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-standing, or
severe effects as a means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.
2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any
State, group of States or international organization to engage in activities contrary to the
provision of paragraph 1 of this article
Article 2:
As used in article 1, the term "environmental modification techniques' refers to any
technique for changing- through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes- the
dynamics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere,
hydrosphere and atmosphere, or outer space Documents, supra note 7, at 370-380.
(emphasis added).
Liebler, supra note 71, at 110. See supra, notes 132-137 and accompanying text,
(discussion on individual and state responsibility under the Geneva Conventions and
Hague Convention IV). See generally, Aldrich, supra note 12.
See supra, text accompanying notes 30-34. (discussion concerning definitional




"intended exclusively for this (ENMOD) Convention and ...
not intended to prejudice the interpretation of the same or similar terms if used in
connection with any other international agreement", Parties interpreted the operative terms
as follows:
a) "widespread": encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers,
b) "long-standing": lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season;
c) "severe": involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and
economic resources or assets. Documents, supra note 7, at 377 However, these
interpretations were not universally accepted and, like the Convention itself, is not
considered customary international law. The Turkish Government's position toward this
ambiguity of terminology is representative of the general approach of states in these
situations: In the opinion of the Turkish Government the terms "widespread", "long-
lasting" and "severe effects" contained in the Convention need to be clearly defined So
long as this clarification is not made the Government of Turkey will be compelled to
interpret itself the terms in question and consequently it reserves the right to do so as and
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when required. Liebler, supra note 71, at 83. Citing Turkish Interpretive Statement, in
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at (sic) 31 December
1989, at 836, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. E/8 (1990).
148 George Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75 Am J. Int'l L. 764, 778 (1981).
CDDH/215/Rev., 1, para 27, Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Official
Records (1974-1977). Reprinted in Liebler, supra note 71, at 111.
See supra, note 3. (discussion on approaches to defining the "environment" and the
ICRC views on the meaning of "natural environment" as used in articles 35(3) and 55.
See also, note 69 and accompanying text (highlighting the long-standing pattern of
"qualification and adaptation" inherent in the conventional development of the laws of
war).
It is clear from the Understandings attached to the Protocol, however, that nuclear
weapons are not considered with the scope of or regulated by this Protocol's prohibitions.
See supra, notes 12 and 147.
152 M. Bothe, K J Partsch & W. A Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts,
para. 2.7, 348. (1982)
See supra, note 140 discussion on articles which provide expansive protection to the
environment
154 ICRC Report, supra note 94, at 5
See supra, Part III, 1(A)(B) and (2)(c), customary law applicability to environmental
protection and discussion of status of the environment under Hague law. Since Geneva
law complements and parallels the Hague Conventions, the observations there are also
pertinent here.
Glen Plant, Elements ofa New Convention on the Protection of the Environment in
Time ofArmed Conflict, in Environmental Protection, supra note 3, 183, 187.
1 en
See G.H. Guttal*, Sources of International Lom: Contemporary Trends, in
International Law in Transition, 183. (R.S Pathak and R.P. Dhokalia eds. 1992) (the
author discusses the contemporary significance of resolutions by the U.N. organs, inter
alia, as sources of legally binding norms, arguing that in view of their growing importance
as borometers of international consensus on normative standards and their perception as
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such by states generally speaking, we need to look beyond the sources listed in Article 38
of the Statute of I.C.J. (*Judge, High Court of Kerala, Cochin, India). See generally,
Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 Am. J Int'l L. 1 (1994), Oscar Schachter,
International Law in Theory and Practice, 85-94 (1991), Blaine Sloan, United Nations
General Assembly Resolutions In Our Changing World (1991).
1 58 Glen Plant, Elements of a 'Fifth Geneva' Convention on the Protection of the
Environment in Time of Armed Conflict, in Environmental Protection, supra note 3, at
41. The ICRC identified these subject as requiring further development and clarification:
...(b) The simultaneous applicability of the rules of international environmental law and
humanitarian law; (c) Determining what body of law is applicable between belligerent and
States which are not party to the conflict but are nevertheless affected by means of warfare
harmful to the natural environment;.... ICRC Report, supra note 94, at 10.
159
Plant, supra note 21, at 162.
See supra note 66, discussion on application of LOS and Kuwait Regional
Convention to Iraq's pollution of the Persian Gulf
ICRC Report supra note 94, at 9. See supra, notes 44-52 and accompanying text,
discussion on function of Martens Clause as vehicle for merging contemporary
environmental norms into laws of war.
The question of what options are available to guide this process is addressed in Part
V infra.
i f\~\
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/Con. 48/14 and corr.l, reprinted in 11 Int'l Leg. M. 1416, 1420 (1972), also reprinted
in International Environmental Law: Basic Instruments and References, 1 72 (Edith Brown
Weiss et al. eds
, 1992) (hereinafter Stockholm Declaration) (all citations Weiss)
The Stockholm Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 1 12-0 (10
abstentions) on 15 December 1972 (UNGA Res 2994).
Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 Am. J.
Int'l L. 259, 266 (1992).
Weiss, supra note 163, at 171. In fact, however, international environmental law
had its genesis in the late 19th century, as states began to enter into "first stage"
conventions protect the "human self-interest" of the present generation in shared resources
or the global commons. The primary motivation for these early accords was essentially
utilitarian and to ensure sustainable exploitation of a common resource, although some
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sought to limit pollution activities to protect the health of the population of state Parties.
Among these treaties are included the 1875 Austria/Hungary and Italy Declaration for the
Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture, the 1 900 Convention Designed to Ensure the
Protection of Various Species of Wild Animals which are Useful to Man or Inoffensive,
the 1931 Whaling Convention and the U.S./Canada Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters
of 1909. See generally, Nature's Rights, supra note 20, at 552-555.
166 Weiss, supra note 163, at 173.
l f\i
Legal Protections, supra note 27, at 3 54.
Weiss, supra note 163, at 172. See e.g., Liebler supra, note 71, at 70.
Legal Protections, supra note 27, at 354
1 70
Supra, note 22. The Special Arbitral Tribunal determined Canada owed
compensation for environmental damage caused in the United States by the Trial Smelter
operating within its borders on the principle that: " No state has the right to use or permit
the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of
another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequences and
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence." Id at 1965.
1 7
1
Liebler, supra note 7 1 , at 72-73
.
1 11
Weiss, supra note 163, at 176.
1 73 The I C.J. in the Barcelona Traction Case recognized general obligations, as
obligations erga omnes, which are owed to and may be vindicated by all states. This may
well be one of those obligations The court stated: An essential distinction should be
drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole,
and those arising vis-a-vis another State. By their very nature the former are the concern
of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to
have a legal interest in their protection, they are obligations erga omnes Barcelona
Traction, Light, & Power Co., (Second Phase)(Belg. v. Sp.) 1970 ICJ Rep. 3, 32
(Judgment of Feb 5). reprinted in Liebler supra note 71, at 74.
See e.g., The Laws of Armed Conflict, at 163 (D. Schindler and J. Toman, eds
1988).
175




Supra, note 22. Propositions articulated by Professor Edith Brown Weiss on
February 21, 1995 during a lecture on "Environmental Disasters", notes with the author.
1 77
Liebler, supra note 71, at 76.
I "70
See supra note 8 and 9 and accompanying text, (discussing U.N. Charter provisions
on self-defense exception to prohibition on use of force).
1 79
Liebler, supra note 71, at 16-11 . Citing Article 32 and 33 of the International Law
Commission's (LLC.) Draft Convention on State Responsibility 1979 LLC. Rep. 329




1 984 I .L
.C . Rep 171, reprinted in Liebler supra note 71, at 75.
1 87
Supra, note 73 Article 1 provides: The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable
documents, supra note 7, at 63. See generally, supra note 22.
1 83
See supra, note 2
1
1 84
Stockholm Declaration, Principle 22, supra note 163, at 176.
1 85
See e.g., Legal Protections, supra note 27, at 354.
See supra note 1 (discussion on norm-building process).
1 87
See generally, Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations International
Law, Common Patrimony and Intergenerational Equity (1989)
1 88
United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the Historical Responsibility of
States for the Protection of Nature for the Benefit of Present and Future Generations.
U.N. Doc. A/Res/35/8 (30 Oct. 1980, 68 in favor-0 opposed- 47 abstentions) reprinted in
Weiss, supra note 163, at 638
189 General Principle 5 World Charter For Nature. G.A. Res. 37/7 (28 October 1982,
1 1 1 in favor- 1 against (U.S.)- 18 abstentions)
77

The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 151/5/Rev. 1 (1992) reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874
191
Guttal, supra note 157, at 188. Judge Guttal observes: "The States are international
political corporations. They are members of the international community as
representatives of their subjects. The rules of international law accepted by a State should
be seen in the context of the individual State's accountability of its citizens. In all systems
of government, the State is accountable to its subjects, on whose behalf it participates in
international life. Naturally, therefore, a State which derives benefit under the
international law or fears its breach by another, obeys the rules of international law, for, a
breach and its consequences makes it answerable to its subjects. This furnishes the
inherent binding element of international law." Id. While I agree with the general thesis
that States are responsive to domestic pressures and that may be one reason for
conforming to community standards, we need only recall the world's recent and ongoing
experience with totalitarian states which behave to further their own interests, thou they
are cognizant that the international repercussions will be most felt by ordinary "subjects"
who have little if any leverage to influence their government's conduct.
192 Id, a 183
193
Id.
1 See generally, e.g., Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to make International Law,
86 Am. J. Int'lL 259(1992).
Legal Protections, supra note 27, at 357.
See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change: A Commentary, 18 Yale J. Int'l L 451 (1993), Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer (1987) and Montreal Ozone Protocol (1987) reprinted in
26 I.L.M. 1529 and 26 I.L.M. 1550, respectively, 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (entry into force March 16, 1983) reprinted in 18 I.L.M.
1442 (1979)(2 Protocols thereto at 27 I.L.M. 698 (1988)); LOS Convention see supra
note 64, 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, 14 May 1954, 249 UNTS 215, 1972 Convention concerning the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris 16 November 1972, 1037
UNTS 151. Most of the above conventions, reprinted in Weiss, supra note 1 58.
197 The Stockholm Declaration preamble declared: To defend and improve the human
environment for present and future generations has become an imperative goal of
mankind—a goal to be pursued together with, and in harmony with, the established and
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fundamental goals of peace and of worldwide economic and social development. See
supra text accompanying note 166.
1 98 Competing policy interests are a significant factor in the balance of interests reflected
by existing law and provide \ substantial obstacles to development of international law
principles which subordinate state interests in armed conflict in favor of explicit protection
of the environment The categories of competing policy alternatives were succinctly
summarized by Captain Winter as follows: "Although there are an infinite number of
potential preferred outcomes, there are essentially four policies that the decision maker in
international law can choose to identify with: 1 ) the policy of a particular state, 2) the
community policy; 3) the policy of the international organization making the decision . . .;
4) the policy of the law itself- integrity, predictability, and objectivity The outcome of the
decision making process is drastically affected by which policy the decision-maker chooses
as his or her primary concern Captain Matthew E Winter, Finding The Law- The
Values, Identity, and Function of the International Law Adviser, 128 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 13
(1990) See generally, McDougal, Jurisprudence For a Free Society, supra note 1
(discussing analytical basis for policy approach to jurisprudence). Almond, Protecting The
Environment, supra note 77, at 329-332 (Part VI describes three distinct strategies of
states discernible in the laws of war: 1) Inclusive/community expectations as reflected in
Hague Conventions. 2) exclusive strategies of individual states which support its
international policy goals-may be consistent with number one, but may define its own
agenda interests resisting "control" under the law. For example, the US understanding to
Protocol I, discussed supra note-^. 3) self-interested strategies to "acquire and invoke
effective power" to achieve its exclusive policy objectives.)
199
id.
See supra, accompanying text to note 140. (refers to customary law principles).
201
Legal Protections, supra note 27, at 357, note 26. This expression "refers to all of
the world's states as they relate to each other " Id.
202 See supra, notes 8 and 9, and accompanying test, for discussion of Charter
provisions
203 Gupta, supra note 18, at 262.
204 See supra note 2\
.
205 U.N. Doc A/Res/47/37, 9 February 1993, Protection Of The Environment In Times
Of Armed Conflict. See also, U.N. Doc. A/46/L.39 (5 December 1991) and U.N. Doc.
79

A/46/693 (27 November 1991) Title: Exploitation Of The Environment As Weapon In
Times of Armed Conflict And The Taking Of Practical Measures To Prevent Such
Exploitation.
See supra, note 157. See generally, Schachter, United Nations Law, id.
1.01
See supra text accompanying note 190.
208 Supra note 205.





See supra note 3 (discussion on definitional problems in environmental law), and
supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussion on definitional problems in laws of war).
212 ICRC Report, supra note 94,at 5.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
See generally, Terry supra note 75. (opposing quantitative limitations on
belligerent's environmental damage as it may hinder the exercise of the right of self-
defense under the Article 51 of the U.N. Charter). See also, supra note 198 (discussing
the role of state policy and strategy alternatives in the development of international law)
2 J 5 Schafer, supra note 29, at 3 1
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Grigory Tunkin, supra note 56, at 180 {see Part III. The Role of
International Organizations: "The problem of primacy of international law in politics,
essential for survival, cannot be solved without a strong international organization. This is
a perspective. A way to it is a step by step strengthening of existing mechanisms of
functioning of international law and creating new ones whenever necessary together with





See generally, U.N. Yearbook, 1993. Chapter IV: Strengthening the role of the
United Nations and Chapter XVII Institutional arrangements, at 1155 and 1117,
respectively. Annex I to General Assembly Resolution 48/162 aptly recognizes the
historical significance of these developments and potential for the United Nations to play
the premier role of a truely world "governing body" as follows:
1
.
The United Nations has a unique and paramount role in the promotion of international
cooperation for development. In the present historical context- the end of the cold war,
the increasing interdependence of nations, the increasing globalization of the world
economy and the growing linkages between economic, social and related issues - the need
for an enhanced role for the United Nations in international cooperation for development
has multiplied manifoldly. This entails, on one hand, strengthening the role of the United
Nations in promoting international economic cooperation for development as envisaged in
the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and, on the other, restructuring and
revitalization of the United Nations in the economic, social and related fields.
5. The United Nations is a unique forum where, based on the principle of sovereign
equality of all States and the universality of its membership, the community of nations can
address all issues in an integrated manner. The organs, organizations and bodies of the
United Nations system have a vital role to play in furthering the analytical work of
relevance to the implementation of global consensus on international economic
cooperation, in promoting and securing the international cooperation needed and in
providing technical assistance Id. at 1118-1119 But cf, Paul W. Kahn, Lessons for
International Lawfrom the Gulf WarA5 Stan L Rev 425 (1993) (Professor Kahn is less
optimistic about the future credibility of international law in part because of its failure to
vindicate fundamental human rights by seeking individual criminal responsibility for war
crimes committed by the Iraqi leadership).
220
See generally, Guttal, supra note 157, 187-188. (Discussing the concept of
"sanctions" as applied in international law notes differences with domestic application and
observes: The sovereign States join the international community with the awareness of
their obligation to obey the laws and then make laws themselves, thereby ensuring that
they will not break them There is the more important internal normative element of
law which obliges a subject to obey the law It obliterates the distinction between an
obligation to obey the law and the threatened consequences")
221
See generally, Agenda 21, United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 1992. Supra, note 190!
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